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Abstract 
 
Prior work finds that managers beneficially time their purchases, but not their sales, prior to their 
forecasts.  Shifting attention from when forecasts are given to if a forecast is given, we link 
insider selling to silence in advance of an earnings disappointment.  In particular, our evidence 
indicates that managers who deliver disappointing news next quarter are less likely to bundle a 
warning with the current quarter’s earnings announcement as the amount of shares they sell in the 
two-week trading window immediately following the current quarter’s earnings announcement 
increases.  These findings suggest that managers rely on a subtle form of opportunism—simply 
remaining quiet, selling shares in this quarter’s heavily trafficked, typically open trading window, 
and then waiting for the earnings disappointment to reveal itself next quarter—as opposed to 
engaging in the overtly opportunistic approach of selling shares just prior to supplying a warning 
about next quarter along with this quarter’s earnings.  This raises the question of whether the 
absence of incriminating trading, as opposed to the presence of a cautionary warning, drives 
reductions in litigation risk potentially attributed to warnings.  Analyzing earnings-disclosure-
related lawsuits, we find that the absence of a warning combined with the presence of selling 
exacerbates the consequences associated with the individual behaviors.  Yet, selling prior to a 
warning typically does not offset all of the warning’s benefit.  In so doing, we supply the first 
robust evidence of a litigation benefit associated with warning—even after considering the role 
that managers’ trading behavior plays in shaping their disclosure decisions and influencing the 
firms’ litigation consequences. 
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disappointment; negative earnings news 
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 1. Introduction 
Skinner (1994) finds that 25% of firms facing large, negative earnings news voluntarily 
warn of the bad news, compared to 6% of the firms facing large, positive news.1  He argues that 
these findings result from managers’ fear of legal liability.  Empirical evidence in support of this 
theory is mixed (Healy and Palepu 2001), with some recent work finding that bad news warnings 
do not trigger litigation and may potentially deter certain types of litigation (Field et al. 2005) but 
still other work arguing that warnings prompt lawsuit filings (Johnson et al. 2007).  In the event 
of a lawsuit, warnings do appear to play a role in lowering settlement costs (Skinner 1997).  If 
managers can indeed lower litigation costs by warning, why do most managers remain silent 
when facing earnings disappointment?  In Skinner (1994)’s sample of firms facing large, 
negative news, 75% of managers elected not to warn.  Studying a more recent time frame, we 
find remarkably similar rates of silence: our evidence indicates that 74% of firms facing 
impending negative news fail to warn.  Further, when we narrow our focus to firms with a recent 
history of supplying guidance, the rate of silence only falls to 52%.  In this paper, we investigate 
whether managers who remain silent in the face of earnings disappointment engage in insider 
selling to exploit knowledge of the impending shortfall and, if so, how this opportunism affects 
firms’ litigation risk. 
Prior research connects insider trading with opportunistic disclosure behavior.  In early 
work, Penman (1982) provides evidence that managers benefit from timing their trades around 
their forecasts of annual earnings.  Noe (1999) builds on this finding to show that managers’ 
opportunistic trading occurs after, but not before, they deliver a forecast.  In more recent work, 
Cheng and Lo (2006) provide evidence that managers opportunistically adjust their forecasting 
activity when they purchase shares.  Yet, they find no evidence to suggest that managers 
                                                
1 Managers voluntarily warn of negative news via their earnings guidance (as captured in either an earnings forecast or an 
earnings preannouncement).  In this paper, we use the terms “disclosure” and “guidance” interchangeably. 
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 strategically adjust either the frequency or the timing of their earnings guidance when they sell 
shares, conjecturing that litigation concerns likely cause managers to avoid selling shares prior to 
issuing bad news forecasts.  Also consistent with a reluctance to engage in blatant opportunism, 
Huddart et al. (2007) find that insiders abstain from profitable trade immediately prior to 
earnings announcements and, instead, trade heavily after earnings announcements (but prior to 
the filing of the formal report) during a time when the legal risks associated with insider trading 
are lower.  Thus, evidence indicates that managers time both their trades and forecasts to exploit 
information asymmetries, but that legal fears constrain overt opportunism associated with insider 
selling immediately prior to the delivery of negative earnings news.   
Building upon these findings, we investigate the link between insider selling and the 
decision to warn in the face of impending negative earnings news.  In contrast to prior work that 
links the timing of a forecast to insider purchasing, we connect strategic silence (i.e., the absence 
of a warning) to insider selling.  In so doing, we shift attention from when forecasts are given to 
if a forecast is given when there is increased incentive to do so.  Focusing on the quarterly 
decision to supply earnings guidance, we document a link between the failure to warn of 
impending earnings disappointment and insider selling.  Consequently, we supply evidence that 
speaks to the question of why managers may fail to warn even if it is in the firm’s best interest 
for them to do so. 
As mentioned, prior work typically examines trading behavior conditional upon the 
presence of a forecast—i.e., prior work begins with a sample of forecasts and examines the 
timing of a trade in relation to the timing of a forecast.  Our research design, however, 
acknowledges the evolving disclosure and trading environment that managers now confront.  In 
particular, we conduct our analysis at the firm-quarter level and focus on whether a forecast is 
given (as opposed to the timing/frequency of forecasts) for two main reasons.  First, the 
overwhelming majority of guidance now arrives bundled with a quarterly earnings release.  Over 
2
 our sample period, approximately 80% of all forecasts are bundled and, in later years, the 
proportion climbs above 90%.  Accordingly, the decision to guide increasingly appears to be 
made on a quarterly (as opposed to a day-to-day) basis.  Second, company-level regulation of 
insider trading generally precludes trading prior to earnings announcements and typically 
encourages insiders to concentrate their trade in the days shortly after earnings announcements.2  
As a result, managers increasingly make disclosure and trading decisions on a quarterly basis and 
in temporal proximity.  These trends reduce managers’ control over the timing of both forecasts 
and trades.  Yet, managers can and do control whether or not they issue a forecast.  Thus, 
because we expect that managers now have less power to time their trades or their forecasts, we 
turn our attention to the question of whether trading incentives help to explain whether managers 
choose to warn or to remain silent in the face of impending bad news.   
 We examine an initial sample of 107,307 quarterly earnings announcements made during 
the decade since Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) took effect in October 2000.  We focus 
on the firm-quarter observations in which managers face impending negative news, as measured 
by the delivery of disappointing earnings news in the next quarter.  Because it is not possible to 
cleanly identify the point at which managers learn of negative earnings news, this approach to 
measuring impending negative earnings news categorizes all managers of firms that report 
negative earnings news next quarter as possessing this knowledge on or before the earnings 
announcement associated with the current quarter.  The measurement error associated with this 
approach likely reduces our ability to detect significant relations in the data: if managers do not 
possess the negative news yet, then they do not have an incentive to sell and, thus, their selling 
                                                
2 Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) document that over 92% of their sample firms have a policy in place to regulate insider 
trading, with 78% of firms having explicit blackout periods in place to preclude insider trades.  Examining the specifics of the 
policies, they note that “[t]he single most common policy disallows trading by insiders at all times except during a trading 
window that is open during the period 3 through 12 trading days after the quarterly earnings announcement.”  (Page 192)  
Consistent with the notion that increased jeopardy accompanies trades that occur during blackout periods, Huddart, Ke and Shi 
(2007) find that insiders disproportionately concentrate their trade in the days immediately following quarterly earnings releases. 
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 behavior should not correlate with their decision to warn of this yet-to-be-learned news.3  
Consequently, our empirical tests investigate whether trading considerations appear to factor into 
the decision to “bundle” a bad news warning with the current quarter’s earnings announcement 
(or, alternatively, the decision to remain silent) for managers who face impending earnings 
disappointment next quarter. 
We find that managers who disappoint investors with negative earnings news next quarter 
are less likely to bundle negative earnings guidance with the current quarter’s earnings news 
when they sell more shares in the two-week trading window following the current quarter’s 
earnings announcement.  That is, the likelihood of warning decreases with insider selling.  The 
observed relation between silence and selling strengthens when we focus exclusively on the 
firm-quarters when the decision to warn versus trade is most relevant.  Specifically, the observed 
relation strengthens when we limit attention to recent and frequent guiders, when we further 
narrow our focus to cases where managers deliver positive current-quarter earnings news 
followed by negative earnings news next quarter, when we focus exclusively on trades of the 
CEO and CFO, and when we use the classification scheme of Cohen et al. (2012) to identify 
opportunistic sales.4  Thus, our evidence suggests that trading incentives help to explain why 
managers, particularly those committed to the practice of supplying guidance, remain silent even 
when prior evidence suggests that legal liability might provide incentives for them to bundle a 
warning with the current quarter’s earnings news.  
Further analysis provides additional evidence that the silence we observe is strategically 
motivated.  In addition to evidence linking the failure to warn with increased selling, we find that 
                                                
3 A wealth of prior literature provides evidence that managers trade in the quarters leading up to important information releases, 
including dividend announcements (John and Lang 1991), repurchases of stock (Lee et al. 1992), equity offerings (Karpoff and 
Lee 1991), bankruptcy filings (Seyhun and Bradley 1997), and 10-Q/10-K filings (Huddart et al. 2007).   Further, focusing 
specifically on trading in advance of earnings disappointment, Ke et al. (2003) find insider selling increases up to nine quarters 
prior to a break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings, while Hugon and Lee (2014) find that insiders’ 10b5-1 
sales predict weakening earnings performance many quarters in advance, which is consistent with earlier evidence in Jagolinzer 
(2009). 
4 As discussed in Section 5, narrowing our focus even further to “committed” guiders mitigates concern that unobserved firm 
characteristics explain the inability/failure to warn, as these firms routinely provide guidance. 
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 managers are more likely to bundle positive earnings guidance with the current quarter’s 
earnings news as the amount of shares they sell in the post-disclosure trading window increases, 
even when facing impending negative news.  Hence, insider selling is not associated with a 
general unwillingness to use guidance to communicate with investors (i.e., managers who trade 
are not always more likely to stay silent).  Rather, the desire to sell shares at artificial prices 
appears to influence managers’ selective/tactical silence. 
Consistent with legal fears constraining opportunism, we find that managers are more 
likely to warn of negative news (and are also more likely to abstain from delivering a positive or 
confirming forecast) as ex ante litigation risk increases.  That is, managers of firms that face 
increased risk of litigation are less likely to engage in strategic silence and, instead, are more 
likely to warn of the impending negative news.  Hence, the incentive to warn trumps the 
incentive to exploit information asymmetries for some (but not all) managers—particularly those 
whose firms have higher ex ante litigation risk.   
Further, among managers who do engage in strategic silence, we find that the decision to 
remain silent links to insider selling that concentrates in the two-week, typically open trading 
window following the current quarter’s earnings release.  This suggests that strategically silent 
managers avoid the increased personal legal jeopardy associated with selling shares immediately 
prior to a negative news revelation.  Instead, they execute their sales in a manner that both 
distances their sales from the market’s eventual receipt of the negative earnings and allows them 
to potentially explain away their sales as taking place within the confines of the firms’ insider 
trading regulations and, as such, part of their routine trading patterns.  This covert approach to 
opportunism—simply remaining quiet, selling shares in this quarter’s open trading window, and 
then waiting for the earnings disappointment to reveal itself next quarter—contrasts with the 
more risky approach of selling shares just prior to the market’s receipt of negative earnings news.  
5
 The evidence discussed above indicates that the managers who are “good” disclosers 
(i.e., likely to warn) are more likely to be “well-behaved” traders (i.e., less likely to sell 
opportunistically).  This raises the question of whether the absence of incriminating trading 
behavior, as opposed to the presence of a cautionary warning, drives reductions in litigation risk 
potentially attributed to disclosure.  Consequently, we next turn our attention to a sample of 
firms that experience earnings-related lawsuit filings in order to examine whether the failure to 
warn, opportunistic insider sales, and/or the interaction of these two behaviors prior to the 
market’s receipt of negative earnings news link to increased litigation risk for the firm.  
Examining the trading and disclosure behavior of these lawsuit firms (along with a group of 
propensity-matched control firms that do not experience such lawsuits), we find strong evidence 
that silence and selling each independently increase litigation risk.  In addition, our evidence 
indicates that the interaction of silence and selling incrementally raises litigation risk.  That is, 
the absence of a warning combined with the presence of insider selling exacerbates the 
consequences associated with the individual behaviors.  The evidence also suggests that selling 
prior to a warning offsets some, but not all, of the warning’s benefit for virtually our entire 
litigation sample.  Thus, a warning still provides some protection against litigation, even if 
accompanied by selling.   
Collectively, our findings suggest that trading incentives influence managers’ guidance 
decisions and, in turn, trading and guidance jointly influence litigation risk.  These findings 
highlight the tension between manager-level trading incentives and firm-level disclosure 
incentives: strategic silence interacts with opportunistic selling by managers to increase the 
litigation consequences borne by the firm.  As mentioned, prior literature aiming to link 
opportunistic trade to opportunistic disclosure finds that managers beneficially time their 
purchases, but not their sales, prior to the delivery of a forecast (Cheng and Lo 2006).  In this 
paper, we link beneficial insider selling to strategic silence (i.e., the forgone opportunity to 
6
 supply a cautionary forecast) in advance of negative earnings news.  That is, we provide 
evidence that trading incentives play a role in not just the timing but also the existence of a 
forecast.  Consequently, in contrast to prior work’s efforts to document overtly opportunistic 
selling immediately prior to the delivery of a bad news forecast, we document a more subtle 
form of opportunism—insider selling immediately following the forgone opportunity to warn of 
next quarter’s earnings shortfall.   
In addition to contributing to the literature examining the extent to which insiders exploit 
information asymmetries, this paper’s findings have important implications for the vast literature 
that studies the factors that influence managers’ disclosure incentives.  Absent direct 
examination of trading-based hypotheses, studies often exclude trading considerations when 
modeling managers’ guidance decisions (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013).  Yet, our paper 
documents a significant correlation between trading and the decision to guide.  As such, our 
findings underscore the importance of considering the interplay between managers’ disclosure 
and trading behavior when studying the costs and benefits associated with disclosure.  
Finally, a long-standing and important question in the disclosure literature focuses on 
whether cautionary warnings of impending bad news deter or trigger litigation.  Early evidence 
suggests that voluntary disclosure does not prevent litigation (Skinner 1997) and, in fact, may 
even prompt it (Francis et al. 1994).  Some recent work, however, indicates that warnings do not 
trigger litigation and, instead, potentially deter certain types of litigation (Field, Lowry, and Shu 
2005), though the evidence on deterrence is weak.  Yet, other recent work continues to suggest 
that warnings elicit lawsuit filings (Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard 2007).  In this study, we 
combine insights from Field et al. (2005) and Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2007) to provide 
the first robust evidence of a litigation benefit associated with disclosure—even after considering 
the role that managers’ trading behavior plays in shaping their disclosure decisions and 
influencing the firms’ litigation consequences. 
7
 The remainder of this paper progresses as follows.  Section 2 provides background and 
discusses the related literature, while Section 3 develops the hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the 
sample selection criteria and data collection procedures, while Section 5 presents the empirical 
analysis of the link between silence and insider selling in the face of impending bad news.  
Section 6 presents the litigation risk analysis.  Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Background on the interplay of disclosure, insider trading and litigation risk 
A typical class action shareholder lawsuit brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 alleges that managers of the company made false or misleading 
statements and/or failed to disclose material adverse information in a timely manner to the 
market, resulting in a period of time when the firm’s stock price was artificially inflated.  The 
class of investors (known as the “plaintiff class”) who purchased the company’s stock during this 
time (known as the “class period”) claims damages that result from managers’ inadequate 
disclosure.  The revelation of negative news as manifested by a considerable drop in the firm’s 
stock price often triggers the filing of a shareholder lawsuit.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys can and do use 
managers’ trading behavior during the class period as evidence of delayed disclosure and intent 
of wrongdoing (i.e., scienter) when filing the lawsuit and negotiating the settlement (Sale 2002, 
Johnson et al. 2007). 
Although nearly all shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 settle before trial, 
settlements often result in sizeable costs to the firm and/or the firm’s insurance provider.  Despite 
the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in December of 1995, 
which was intended to protect publicly traded firms from abuse of class action securities 
litigation, both the number of lawsuits filed and the average settlement amounts surged in the late 
8
 1990s and early 2000s, and have generally remained at those levels since then.5  Shareholder 
lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 and their associated resolution costs form the basis of the preemption 
hypothesis introduced by Skinner (1994). 
Skinner (1994) suggests that aversion to legal liability causes managers to voluntarily 
warn of negative news.  In particular, Skinner (1994) hypothesizes that U.S. securities laws 
provide incentives for managers to disclose negative news voluntarily.  Because announcements 
of large, negative earnings surprises increase the likelihood of potentially costly 10b-5 lawsuits, 
he argues that managers benefit from warnings because such preemptive disclosures both reduce 
the plaintiffs’ ability to claim that managers failed to release material information promptly and 
limit the size of the plaintiff class by reducing the period of nondisclosure.  As such, Skinner 
suggests that the costs of failing to disclose bad news exceed the costs of failing to disclose good 
news.  In fact, legal liability provides disincentive to disclose good news, as managers may be 
held accountable for ex post optimistic good news forecasts. 
Early work provides mixed evidence to support the premise that voluntary disclosure 
reduces litigation consequences (Healy and Palepu 2001).  Examining a litigation sample of 45 
observations covering 1988 to 1992, Francis et al. (1994) find that managers’ warnings prompted 
28 of the lawsuits, which suggests that warnings do not always deter, and in certain cases may 
even trigger, lawsuit filings.6  Arguing that the control sample of similarly “vulnerable” firms 
used by Francis et al. (1994) differs from the lawsuit sample in, among other respects, size and 
the extent to which the market expected the adverse news, Skinner (1997) re-examines the 
relation between disclosure and litigation.  Unlike Francis et al. (1994), Skinner (1997) uses the 
litigation firms as their own controls by comparing the firms’ disclosure behavior during quarters 
                                                
5 See http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/04/2013-mid-year-securities-litigation-update/ or  
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2013_YIR/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-
MYA.pdf for details. 
6 Francis et al. (1994) select a control sample of “at risk” firms that experienced earnings declines that were, on average, 50 
percent more than the average declines reported by the sample of firms in the same industries that were subject to litigation.  
They find that 46 of 53 of these control firms similarly vulnerable to litigation did not warn of the impending negative news. 
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 when they faced litigation to their disclosure behavior during quarters when they did not face 
litigation.  Like Francis et al. (1994), however, Skinner (1997) finds evidence that early 
disclosure does not prevent litigation, as disclosure during lawsuit quarters is more timely than 
disclosure during non-lawsuit quarters. 
Studies focusing on the relation between disclosure and the incidence of litigation must 
consider that disclosure behavior and the probability of litigation are endogenous to the severity 
of the news, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of disclosure on the probability of 
litigation.  Using a simultaneous equations methodology, Field et al. (2005) find evidence that is 
inconsistent with the notion that warnings trigger litigation and, instead, provide weak evidence 
that early disclosure deters certain types of litigation.7  As such, in contrast to prior work, Field et 
al. (2005) supply some evidence to suggest that managers’ disclosure decisions may lower firms’ 
litigation risk. 
Although the literature examining the link between litigation and disclosure typically 
excludes trading considerations from their analyses, a study by Johnson et al. (2007) is the 
exception.  Using a research design that does not account for the endogeneity concerns 
highlighted by Field et al. but that does consider the link between trading and litigation, Johnson 
et al. (2007) find that litigation likelihood increases with both the presence of abnormal trading 
and earnings warnings.  Thus, absent efforts to tackle endogeneity or to consider the interplay 
between disclosure and trading, this work offers no support for a deterrence effect to warnings 
and, instead, suggests that disclosure and trading both prompt lawsuit filings.  
In summary, recent evidence indicates that disclosure may reduce firms’ litigation risk, as 
well as their lawsuit settlement amounts.  Yet, none of this research considers whether trading 
incentives influence the likelihood that a manager supplies a negative news warning or whether 
                                                
7 In particular, Field et al. (2005) do not detect a significant coefficient on their warn instrument in their main analysis (see their 
Table 4), but do detect significance at the 5% level for a one-tailed test when they remove lawsuits that were dismissed from the 
sample (see their Table 5). 
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 the combination of silence and selling influences firms’ litigation risk.  Do trading incentives 
help explain why some managers forego the potential benefits associated with preemptive 
warnings?  And, if the silent managers also trade opportunistically in the face of impending 
earnings disappointment, this raises the question of whether the presence of incriminating selling 
behavior, as opposed to the absence of a preemptive warning, drives the increased litigation risk 
potentially attributed to non-disclosure in the Field et al. study. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Managers face both disclosure and trading decisions when they learn of impending 
negative news.  Although securities laws provide penalties for failing to disclose material news 
in a timely manner, trading opportunities might cause some managers to stay quiet.  If managers 
trade prior to disclosing the negative news, litigation consequences associated with delayed 
disclosure may increase, as shareholders’ attorneys can and do use trading behavior as evidence 
of managers’ disclosure delays (Sale 2002; Johnson et al. 2007).  Because the strength of the 
plaintiffs’ case largely depends on the assertion that managers knowingly withheld adverse 
information, managers may improve the plaintiffs’ bargaining position by trading prior to the 
market’s receipt of the negative news.  Yet, some managers might remain quiet (i.e., fail to 
supply a cautionary forecast) in order to sell shares at inflated prices because the firm (and its 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance carrier) may suffer most of the consequences.  
Although prior research documents increased turnover among managers following both lawsuit 
filings and earnings restatements (Niehaus and Roth 1999, Desai et al. 2006), managers’ trading 
behavior does not appear to increase turnover rates within lawsuit firms.8    
                                                
8 Because the firing of top executives could strengthen the bargaining position of plaintiffs during settlement negotiations (as it 
may offer support for claims of a manager’s wrongdoing), firms may be less likely to replace CEOs immediately following the 
filing of a shareholder lawsuit.  Consistent with this notion, Billings (2008) finds no evidence to suggest that trading behavior 
11
 Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, prior evidence suggests that managers are reticent to 
engage in overtly opportunistic selling prior to negative news warnings.  These findings do, 
however, suggest that managers formulate their trading decisions in concert with their disclosure 
decisions.  Thus, while managers who choose to warn are reticent to sell shares immediately 
prior to a warning, managers may be willing to engage in a subtler form of opportunism: 
managers may remain silent in the face of impending negative news in order to dispose of shares 
in the open trading window immediately following the current quarter’s earnings announcement.   
Among the managers who do remain silent, we expect the presence of firm-level insider 
trading restrictions to influence when they choose to exploit knowledge of the impending bad 
news.  In particular, as depicted in Figure 1, we expect that the decision to remain silent will link 
to insider selling that is concentrated in the low-jeopardy, typically open trading window (i.e., 
“green sales” trading window) following the announcement of the current quarter’s earnings, 
consistent with Bettis et al. (2000) and Huddart et al. (2007).9  This allows them to execute their 
trades in a manner that both distances their sales from the market’s eventual receipt of the 
negative earnings and also allows them to potentially explain away their sales as taking place 
within the confines of the firms’ insider trading regulations and, as such, part of their routine 
trading patterns. 
At the same time, we do not expect to observe a link between the decision to warn and 
insider selling that is concentrated in the high-jeopardy, typically closed trading windows (i.e., 
the “lag red sales” and “lag yellow sales” trading windows) leading up to the announcement of 
the current quarter’s earnings.  In other words, we predict the presence of covert opportunism—
                                                                                                                                                       
helps to explain turnover among managers of firms that faced earnings-disclosure-related (as opposed to fraud-based) shareholder 
litigation.  Further, examining SEC enforcement actions and lawsuit settlement amounts, Billings (2008) detects no instance of 
SEC involvement or monetary penalties for managers of strictly earnings-disclosure-based (as opposed to fraud-based) lawsuits. 
9 If managers become aware of the impending negative news as early as two quarters before, we expect to detect a link between 
trading in the low-jeopardy window associated with last quarter’s earnings announcement (i.e., the “lag green sales” trading 
window) as well. 
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 simply remaining quiet, selling shares in the open trading window immediately following the 
current quarter’s earnings announcement, and then waiting for the earnings disappointment to 
reveal itself next quarter—as opposed to evidence of the more risky approach of selling shares 
just prior to supplying a warning about next quarter along with this quarter’s earnings.  
Accordingly, our first hypothesis predicts the following relation between managers’ disclosure 
and trading behavior: 
H1: When facing earnings disappointment, managers are less likely to supply a 
preemptive bad news warning about next quarter’s earnings as the amount of 
shares they sell in the two-week trading window following the current quarter’s 
earnings release increases. 
 
Of course, the cost of silence in the face of impending bad news is not the same for all 
managers.  Accordingly, we anticipate cross-sectional variation in the likelihood that a manager 
engages in strategic silence.  In particular, consistent with the preemption hypothesis in Skinner 
(1994), we expect that managers of firms operating in high litigation risk environments are less 
likely to remain silent and, instead, are more likely to preemptively warn.  Thus, we predict the 
following with respect to the disclosure behavior of the managers in high-litigation 
environments: 
H2: When facing earnings disappointment, managers are more likely to supply a 
preemptive bad news warning about next quarter’s earnings when the ex ante 
likelihood of litigation for the firm is high. 
 
While the choice to remain silent in the face of impending negative earnings news allows 
managers to profit by reducing their personal holdings, we expect that this personally 
opportunistic behavior plays a role in triggering litigation consequences for the firm.  Indeed, the 
findings of Field et al. (2005) suggest that such silence may increase firms’ litigation risk.  
Extant evidence also indicates that litigation risk increases with insider selling (Jones and 
Weingram 1996, Johnson et al. 2007).  Accordingly, we expect that the interaction of the 
absence of a preemptive warning with the presence of opportunistic selling incrementally 
13
 increases the likelihood that shareholders file lawsuits above the consequences of the individual 
behaviors.  Our third hypothesis predicts the following interactive effect of silence and selling on 
firms’ litigation risk: 
H3: The failure to warn interacted with the presence of opportunistic selling  
prior to the market’s receipt of negative earnings news incrementally increases 
firms’ litigation risk. 
 
If, as we expect, managers’ trading behavior and disclosure behavior both play a role in 
shareholders’ decisions to file a lawsuit, this raises the question of whether managers’ 
opportunistic selling completely counteracts any benefit associated with preemptive warning.  In 
our tests of H3, we will examine whether (and, if so, the extent to which) incriminating trading 
behavior undermines the benefit of timely disclosure. 
 
4. Data 
In our first analyses, we examine a sample of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 
2001 through 2010.  This dataset reflects the intersection of financial statement data available 
from Compustat, security price data from CRSP, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, earnings 
guidance data from First Call, and insider trading from Thomson Reuters.  We obtain the report 
date of quarterly earnings (RDQ) and earnings for all firm quarters in Compustat.  We collect 
share price, return, shares outstanding and volume data from CRSP and use these data to 
compute the market value of a firm’s equity each quarter (MVE), the 90-day return ending three 
days prior to the earnings release date (PRIOR_RET), and the standard deviation of returns over 
that 90-day period (VOLATILITY).  We add analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, using the 
unadjusted detail file three days prior to each RDQ.  We calculate the number of analyst 
forecasts (NUMEST) that are no more than 90 days old (i.e., non-stale), and the standard 
deviation of these non-stale analyst forecasts (DISPERSION).  We measure each quarter’s 
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 surprise (SURPRISE) as reported earnings minus the most recent non-stale median analyst 
estimate, deflated by stock price three trading days prior to the RDQ.10  
We collect guidance data from First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines (“CIG”) file.  
First, we code a variable (BUNDLE) to indicate when a management forecast occurs during the 5 
trading days centered on the RDQ.11  Next, we distinguish three types of forecast news in our 
coding: negative (N_FORECAST), positive (P_FORECAST), and confirming (C_FORECAST).  
Specifically, we code bundled guidance as negative (positive) if management supplies an 
earnings estimate that falls below (exceeds) the prevailing consensus (i.e., the median analyst 
forecast) one day before the guidance date.  We code the remaining guidance as confirming, 
capturing cases where management supplies guidance that does not differ from the prevailing 
consensus.  Finally, we also code indicator variables that reflect the firm’s recent guidance 
history.  GUIDE_CQTR indicates whether the firm previously provided guidance at any time for 
the current quarter’s earnings.  BUNDLE_PRIOR indicates whether the firm bundled earnings 
guidance with the prior quarter’s RDQ.  To distinguish firms based on a recently demonstrated 
willingness to use guidance to communicate earnings news to investors, we also code indicator 
variables that allow us to partition the sample based on firms’ histories of recent and committed 
guidance: RECENT_GUIDER equals one for firms with at least one instance of guidance in the 
prior 12 quarters, while COMMITTED_GUIDER equals one for firms with at least three 
instances of guidance in the prior 12 quarters. 
The addition of insider trading data obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Stock Transactions 
file represents the final step in the assembly of our dataset.  In constructing our quarterly trading 
                                                
10 Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), we code two indicator variables to reflect the sign of the earnings surprise.  
P_SURPRISE (N_SURPRISE) equals 1 if SURPRISE for the current quarter exceeds +0.0001 (falls below −0.0001).  In our 
multivariate tests, we include the absolute value of surprise (i.e., |SURPRISE|) as well as P_SURPRISE and N_SURPRISE. 
11 Our use of a 5-day window follows from prior work (Anilowski, Feng and Skinner 2007).  All results remain if we exclude the 
3% of our firm-quarter observations where the guidance does not arrive exactly on the RDQ.  Further, of the 107,307 firm-
quarters in our sample, we note 1,932 firm-quarters (1.8%) where management refrained from bundling negative guidance but 
then gave non-bundled negative guidance before the subsequent earnings announcement.  All results remain if we exclude these 
firm-quarters from the analysis.   
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 measures, we concentrate on the behavior of directors and officers, consistent with prior work 
(Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard 2007).  This focuses our attention on the trading decisions of 
insiders who are more likely to be aware of impending negative news and who are also more 
likely to influence the firms’ disclosure decisions.  In fact, because we expect the disclosure and 
trading decisions to be most salient for the CEO and CFO, we also conduct all of our tests using 
measures of selling based exclusively on the trades of the CEO and CFO.  We measure quarterly 
selling by insiders (SALES) as the total dollar value of insider sales scaled by beginning quarter 
MVE.  We classify sales as opportunistic (SALES_OPP) or routine (SALES_ROU) based on the 
individual trade-level classification scheme developed in Cohen et al. (2012).    
Prior work indicates that the company-level restrictions of insider trading often require 
insiders to limit their trade to the two weeks immediately following firms’ quarterly earnings 
announcements (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon 2000).  Consequently, we measure insider sales over 
three distinct trading windows during each quarter.  As shown in Figure 1, we measure 
GREEN_SALES as the sales most likely to be allowed under the company’s insider trading policy 
(i.e., the sales that fall in the two-week (10-day trading) period starting after the release of last 
quarter’s earnings).12  We measure RED_SALES as the sales least likely to be allowed under the 
company’s insider trading policy (i.e., the sales that take place between current fiscal quarter end 
(FQE) and the current quarter’s RDQ).  YELLOW_SALES capture the sales that take place 
between the green and the red trading windows. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 107,307 firm-quarter 
observations in the full sample.  Similar to Anilowski, Feng and Skinner (2007), we find that 
approximately 31% (n=32,910) of the sample’s quarterly earnings announcements coincide with 
the issuance of guidance (BUNDLE=1).  Consistent with the preemption hypothesis in Skinner 
                                                
12 Results are robust to increasing the GREEN_SALES trading window from 10 to 15 trading days. 
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 (1994), negative forecasts (N_FORECAST=1) are more than twice as likely as positive forecasts 
(P_FORECAST=1).  
Identifying firm-quarters in which the decision to warn is especially relevant to managers 
As mentioned earlier, we identify the quarters in which the decision to warn versus 
remain silent should be especially salient for managers.  These are the firm-quarters for which 
managers: (1) face impending negative earnings news, (2) have recently demonstrated a 
commitment to using guidance to communicate earnings news to investors, and (3) may wish to 
temper a positive earnings surprise with a cautionary warning about next quarter. 
Managers facing impending negative news 
We identify cases where managers face impending negative earnings news by setting an 
indicator variable (IMPEND_BAD) equal to one if the firm reports disappointing earnings news 
in the next quarter (i.e., quarter t+1).  We identify the presence of disappointing earnings news 
based on the issuance of a negative management forecast (i.e., N_FORECAST = 1) or the 
reporting of negative earnings news (i.e., N_SURPRISE = 1) in the next quarter.13  When we use 
IMPEND_BAD to partition the full sample, we identify 43,664 firm-quarter observations where 
managers confront the choice of whether to warn or to remain silent in the current quarter.  Panel 
B of Table 1 supplies descriptive statistics for this subsample.  Our earlier evidence from the full 
sample (see Panel A) provided support for Skinner’s hypothesis: managers are more likely to 
preempt bad news than good news with guidance.  Yet, shifting our attention to the subset of 
observations in which managers face earnings disappointment (see Panel B), we notice that many 
managers facing impending negative news do not supply a warning, as only 26% (11,238 ÷ 
43,664) bundle a forecast (either quarterly or annual) of negative news for next quarter with the 
current quarter’s earnings announcement.  In our tests we examine whether managers’ post-
                                                
13 Results are robust to measuring disappointing earnings news using a seasonal-random-walk model.  Specifically, following 
Skinner (1994), we define “bad” earnings news as earnings changes less than 5% of stock price, assuming the seasonal-random-
walk model provides a good approximation for the market’s expectation of quarterly earnings.  
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 earnings-announcement selling helps to explain this silence.  Because our tests aim to identify 
the factors associated with the decision to guide in a particular quarter (as opposed to identifying 
the factors that determine a firm’s overall decision to commit to the practice of supplying 
earnings guidance), we next focus on those instances where managers with a recent history of 
using guidance to communicate with investors face the decision to warn. 
Managers with recent guiding histories facing impending negative news 
Prior literature emphasizes that it is a sustained commitment to disclosure that affects a 
firm’s information environment (Diamond and Verrrecchia 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; 
Clinch and Verrecchia 2013).  Recent evidence indicates that it is costly to discontinue guidance, 
as announcements of stoppage are associated with significant drops in share price and 
assumptions of negative future earnings news by analysts (Houston, Lev and Tucker 2010; Chen, 
Matsumoto and Rajgopal 2011).  Accordingly, we expect that managers who have not guided in 
the past are less likely to supply a negative news warning in the current quarter.  We identify the 
subset of those IMPEND_BAD observations for which the firm has recently guided (i.e., 
RECENT_GUIDER = 1) and the subset of those observations where the firm has frequently 
guided (i.e., COMMITTED_GUIDER = 1) in order to focus on those cases where managers 
cannot explain away their silence in the current quarter as a general reticence to guide.   
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, this process identifies 22,566 firm-quarters in which 
managers with recent guiding histories face earnings disappointment (i.e., IMPEND_BAD = 1 
and RECENT_GUIDER = 1).  As expected, the incidence of bundled guidance in the current 
quarter climbs to 45.9% in this subsample of recent guiders.  Although not tabulated in Panel A, 
the incidence of current-quarter bundling increases from approximately 50% (68%) to 64% 
(74%) for recent (committed) guiders over our sample period.  Moreover, as the frequency of 
bundled guidance in the firm’s history increases, the incidence of bundled guidance in the 
current quarter climbs.  As shown in Panel A, when the firm has provided bundled guidance in 
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 10 to 12 of the prior 12 quarters, the incidence of current-quarter bundling reaches 92.0%.  This 
analysis suggests that our definition of committed guider successfully identifies managers with a 
real commitment to provide guidance.  Indeed, further untabulated analyses suggest that the 
median committed guider bundles guidance in 8 of the prior 12 quarters (with an interquartile 
range of 5 to 11 quarters). 
Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the subset of 19,166 firm-quarter 
observations where managers with committed guiding histories face impending negative news 
(IMPEND_BAD=1 and COMMITTED_GUIDER=1).  Not surprisingly, this focus on committed 
guiders has an impact on the incidence of warning.  While approximately 74% (32,426 ÷ 43,664) 
of all firms facing impending negative news fail to warn (see Panel B of Table 1), we note that 
49% (9,449 ÷ 19,166) of committed guiders do the same (see Panel B of Table 2).  Though not 
tabulated, the rate of silence is similar for the recent guider subsample, as 52% of recent guiders 
fail to warn.  Thus, even among firms with a history of recent and frequent guidance, managers 
often remain silent when facing earnings disappointment. 
Finally, we also examine situations where managers may wish to moderate positive 
earnings news delivered in the current quarter with guidance that aims to decrease investors’ 
expectations about the firm’s performance in the next quarter.  We use the presence of a positive 
earnings surprise in the current quarter (i.e., P_SURPRISE = 1) to identify the quarters in which 
managers have this additional incentive to warn.  We find that 13,468 firm-quarter observations 
involve situations where a recent guider faces impending negative news and delivers positive 
earnings news in the current quarter.  Interestingly, as we narrow our focus to situations where 
managers have increased incentive to warn, we again find that the proportion of managers 
remaining silent remains relatively stable.  Focusing on managers facing earnings 
disappointment but supplying positive news in the current quarter, we find (in untabulated 
analyses) that approximately 51% of them fail to warn.  Moreover, nearly 16% of these 
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 managers supply positive forward-looking guidance leading into a disappointing quarter.  In our 
multivariate tests, we exploit cross-sectional variation in bundled forecast news to examine 
whether post-announcement selling helps to explain the quarters in which managers remain silent 
or use guidance to communicate earnings news to investors. 
Intra-quarter insider selling 
As described earlier, our quarterly measures of insider sales identify trade that is more 
likely (RED), less likely (YELLOW), and least likely (GREEN) to be restricted by firms’ insider 
trading regulations.  Consistent with Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000), Huddart, Ke and Shi 
(2007), Table 3 reports evidence that a disproportionate amount of selling takes place in the 
GREEN trading window after the RDQ.  In particular, as shown in both Panel A (for the full 
sample) and Panel B (for the impending negative news subsample), while the GREEN window 
comprises only 16% of the quarter, 36% of the quarter’s total insider selling (based on dollar 
value) occurs in the window.  In contrast, while the RED window comprises 30% of the quarter, 
only 9% of the quarter’s total selling occurs in the window.  
Acknowledging the fact that not all insider trading is motivated by a desire to exploit 
information asymmetries, Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) develop a classification scheme 
that distinguishes “routine” insider trades from “opportunistic” insider trades.14  Consequently, 
we use Cohen et al.’s individual trade-level classification scheme to separately identify routine 
(“SALES_ROU”) and opportunistic (“SALES_OPP”) sales.  Given that Cohen et al.’s 
classification scheme is based on the frequency of trades executed by an insider in a particular 
month in his/her history, it is not surprising that very few “red-window” sales are classified as 
                                                
14 In particular, Cohen et al. (2012) develop a classification scheme that distinguishes “routine” insider trades from 
“opportunistic” insider trades based on the past history of trades (i.e., the pattern and timing of trades in the insider’s recent 
history).  Cohen et al. corroborate their approach to partitioning trades by documenting that the trades flagged as “opportunistic” 
are powerful predictors of future firm returns, news and events, but that the “routine” trades have no predictive powers. 
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 routine.  In untabulated analyses, we document very similar trading patterns for our other 
subsamples.   
We next examine the relation between insider selling and strategic silence.  Figure 1 
depicts the firm-quarter setup that we use to address the research question:  Does insider selling 
explain managers’ decision to remain silent in the face of impending earnings disappointment? 
 
 
5. Selling and the decision to remain silent 
Selling and the likelihood of a bundled forecast 
H1 predicts that managers facing impending earnings disappointment are less likely to 
preemptively warn if they plan to trade to exploit this knowledge.  To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate the following logistic regression model based on Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013): 
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     (1)  
The presence of negative guidance bundled with the current quarter’s earnings announcement 
(i.e., N_FORECAST =1) serves as the dependent variable.  Consistent with Rogers and Van 
Buskirk (2013), we predict that the likelihood of current-quarter guidance increases with past 
guidance.  Accordingly, the inclusion of both GUIDE_CQTR and BUNDLE_PRIOR allows us to 
focus on the factors associated with the decision to guide in the current quarter—as opposed to 
examining the factors that determine firms’ decisions to commit to an overall practice of issuing 
guidance.15  Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) we also control for the current quarter’s 
                                                
15 Not surprisingly, BUNDLE_PRIOR and GUIDE_CQTR are highly correlated (61% Spearman correlation in the full sample of 
firm-quarter observations and 38% Spearman correlation in the subsample of firm-quarter observations for recent guiders).  
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 earnings news (P_SURPRISE, N_SURPRISE, |SURPRISE|, and LOSS), the information 
environment of the firm (DISPERSION, LOG_NUMEST, LOG_MVE), and recent performance 
(PRIOR_RET).  Following Billings et al. (2014), we also control for forecast difficulty with the 
inclusion of the level of stock return volatility (VOLATILITY). 
The inclusion of LITIGATION RISK (i.e., the ex ante probability estimate of the 
likelihood that the firm will be subject to 10b-5 litigation in the next quarter) and SALES in 
Equation (1) allows us to test our first and second hypotheses.16  Consistent with the preemption 
hypothesis in Skinner (1994), H2 predicts that managers facing higher ex ante litigation risk are 
more likely to warn in the face of impending negative news and, accordingly, we predict a 
positive coefficient for LITIGATION RISK.   
H1 predicts a negative coefficient for SALES: selling is associated with a decreased 
likelihood of negative earnings warnings (i.e., an increased likelihood of remaining silent).  As 
mentioned earlier, we expect trading restrictions to influence managers’ selling patterns.  
Consequently, we expect that the decision to remain silent will link to insider selling that is 
concentrated in the low-jeopardy, typically open trading window following the announcement of 
the current quarter’s earnings.  Thus, we predict a negative coefficient for GREEN_SALES.  If 
managers are aware of the impending negative news earlier, we also expect sales in the prior 
quarter’s open trading window (i.e., LAG_GREEN_SALES) to exhibit a negative coefficient. 
 Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) for the full sample (in 
column [1]) and successive subsamples with impending bad news (column [2]), with recent 
guidance histories (column [3]), with committed guiding histories (column [4]), and reporting 
                                                                                                                                                       
Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) we include both in our tabulated regressions.  All of our results remain when we re-
estimate our regressions excluding either BUNDLE_PRIOR or GUIDE_CQTR. 
16 As described in Appendix A, we estimate a quarterly measure of ex ante litigation risk following the model developed by Kim 
and Skinner (2012). 
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 positive earnings news in the current quarter (column [5]).  In column [6], we further narrow our 
focus by using the trades of only the CEO and CFO.  In all cases, we find support for H1: the 
coefficients on GREEN_SALES and LAG_GREEN_SALES are significantly negative.17  
Consistent with legal fears constraining opportunism (i.e., H2), we also find that managers are 
more likely to warn of negative news as ex ante litigation risk increases, as evidenced by the 
positive coefficient for LITIGATION RISK in Panel A.  This suggests that managers who 
disappoint investors with negative earnings news next quarter are less likely to bundle forward-
looking negative earnings guidance with the current quarter’s earnings news as the number of 
shares they sell increases.  Yet, in the presence of increased litigation risk, managers are less 
likely to keep quiet.  Further, as we narrow our focus to the managers for whom the decision to 
warn versus stay silent is most salient (i.e., moving from column [1] to column [6]), we find that 
the mean marginal effect on GREEN_SALES increases.  In fact, limiting analysis to CEO/CFO 
trades only in column [6], our evidence indicates that when these insiders increase their green-
window sales by 1% of MVE, the likelihood of a preemptive warning declines by 3.37%.18   
The results presented in Panel B provide additional evidence that the silence we observe 
is strategically motivated.  In this panel, we re-estimate Equation (1) but this time predict the 
presence of a positive bundled forecast (i.e., P_FORECAST =1).  In contrast to evidence linking 
the failure to warn with increased selling, we find that managers are more likely to bundle 
positive earnings guidance (P_FORECAST = 1) with the current quarter’s earnings news as the 
                                                
17 The significance of both coefficients supports H1, as this indicates that selling prior to the market’s receipt of the disappointing 
earnings news is associated with a failure to warn.  The larger (i.e., more negative) coefficient for GREEN_SALES is consistent 
with the notion that managers are more likely to be aware of the negative news as of the current quarter’s RDQ as opposed to as 
of the prior quarter’s RDQ.  If managers are not aware of the impending disappointment, they do not have an incentive to sell. 
18 In untabulated results, we re-estimate all regression equations with the inclusion of the contemporaneous YELLOW_SALES and 
RED_SALES variables.  In all specifications, we detect no relation between RED_SALES and the decision to warn of impending 
negative news and we find limited evidence of a negative relation between YELLOW_SALES and the decision to warn (with 2 of 
the 6 specifications detecting significance at the 0.10 level).  In our tabulated analyses, we focus on GREEN_SALES as these 
sales take place immediately after the disclosure decision is made and are also made within the low jeopardy trading window.  
23
 amount of shares sold in the green window increases.19  Again, we notice that the mean marginal 
effect grows as we narrow our focus to the observations in which the decision to warn is most 
relevant.  Hence, insider selling is not associated with a general unwillingness to use guidance to 
communicate with investors (i.e., managers who trade are not always more likely to remain 
silent).  Rather, the desire to sell shares appears to play a role in managers’ selective/tactical 
silence.  As such, the combined evidence suggests that managers’ quarterly disclosure decisions 
contain elements of subtle opportunism.  Again consistent with Skinner (1994), LITIGATION 
RISK enters the later regressions (i.e., those in Panel B) with the opposite coefficient.  That is, 
managers are less likely to deliver a positive/confirming forecast as ex ante litigation risk 
increases.  Further, the increased magnitude of the coefficient in these regressions (as compared 
to those in Panel A) suggests that managers who are fearful of litigation are especially hesitant to 
supply positive news to investors. 
As discussed earlier, because it is not possible to cleanly identify the point at which 
managers learn of earnings news, our approach to measuring impending negative news 
categorizes managers of all firms that report negative earnings news next quarter as possessing 
this knowledge in the current quarter.  The measurement error associated with this approach 
likely reduces our ability to detect significant relations in the data, as the trading behavior of 
managers who are unaware of impending negative news should not help to predict whether they 
warn of this yet-to-be-known news.  Nonetheless, if a manager’s ability to forecast the firm’s 
future earnings is associated with unobserved firm characteristics that correlate in some way with 
insider sales, then this could potentially explain the observed link between disclosure and selling.  
The fact that our results in Panels A and B of Table 4 hold when we narrow our focus to the 
                                                
19 Focusing on management forecasts that confirm current earnings expectations (i.e., C_FORECAST = 1), in untabulated 
analyses we detect no significant relation between managers’ selling behavior and the decision to supply a forecast.  We do, 
however, find that the likelihood of supplying a confirming forecast decreases with ex ante litigation risk.   
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 disclosure decisions of committed guiders suggests that a firm’s general willingness/ability to 
guide does not explain our findings. 
To further address this concern, Panel C of Table 4 replicates the analyses in Panels A 
and B but limits attention to the 11,716 firm-quarters in which committed guiders who recently 
bundled—in both the same quarter of last year and in the prior quarter (i.e., BUNDLE_SQLY=1 
and BUNDLE_PRIOR=1)—face the decision to warn of impending negative news.  This allows 
our tests to focus on explaining the quarters in which committed guiders do or do not warn as 
opposed to explaining whether the firm is a guider or not.  In so doing, it further addresses any 
concern that unobserved firm characteristics explain the inability/failure to warn, as these firms 
routinely provide guidance.  Indeed, untabulated analyses indicate that the mean (median) 
committed guider that bundled in both the prior quarter and in the same quarter of last year 
bundled in 9.9 (11) of the prior 12 quarters.  As shown in all specifications of Panel C, all of our 
results remain.  That is, insider selling helps to predict the quarters in which a firm that guides 
the overwhelming majority of the time remains silent.  And, as in our earlier regressions in Panel 
B, we again find that the relations reverse when we shift to predicting positive guidance (i.e., 
P_FORECAST) in the last two specifications.  Consequently, this mitigates any concern that our 
earlier evidence merely reflects unobserved firm traits that correlate with a firm’s willingness 
and ability to guide.  
Opportunistic selling 
 In Table 5 we repeat our previous analysis using Cohen et al.’s individual trade-level 
classification scheme to separately identify routine (“ROU”) and opportunistic (“OPP”) trades.  
For brevity, we do not tabulate the control variables.  As in Table 4, Panel A reports the 
prediction of negative guidance (N_FORECAST), while Panel B reports the prediction of 
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 positive guidance (P_FORECAST).  Consistent with the notion that managers’ failure to warn is 
strategically motivated, we find that the failure to warn links to opportunistic, as opposed to 
routine, trade: SALES_OPP are associated with a decreased (increased) likelihood of delivering a 
negative (positive) news warning in the face of impending earnings disappointment.  This result 
remains/strengthens when we limit analysis to the firm-quarters in which frequent guiders deliver 
disappointing earnings news next quarter in contrast to positive current-quarter earnings news 
and when we limit analysis to the trades of the CEO and CFO (columns [2] through [6]).  
Morever, routine sales in the green window are never significantly associated with the decision 
to warn.  Again, we notice the expected contrasting signs for LITIGATION RISK: managers are 
more (less) likely to give a negative (positive) news forecast as ex ante risk of punishment 
increases. 
In summary, the observed relation between silence and selling strengthens when we limit 
attention to the quarterly observations for which the decision to warn versus trade is most 
relevant and when we narrow our focus to measures of opportunistic trade by just the CEO and 
CFO.  Further, when we shift our attention to the likelihood that managers deliver a positive 
forecast with the current quarter’s earnings announcement, we see just the opposite: 
opportunistic selling is associated with increased likelihood of disclosure.  Yet, we notice a 
reticence to engage in opportunistic disclosure as ex ante litigation risk increases.   
Combined, this evidence indicates that trading incentives help to explain why some 
managers strategically remain silent even though legal liability may provide incentive for them 
to bundle a warning with the current quarter’s earnings announcement.  These results contribute 
to the literature examining managers’ incentives to correct information asymmetries via negative 
news warnings as well as the literature examining insiders’ exploitation of information 
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 asymmetries.  Absent direct examination of trading-based hypotheses, studies often exclude 
trading considerations when modeling managers’ guidance decisions.  These findings underscore 
the importance of considering the interplay between managers’ disclosure and trading behavior 
when studying the costs and benefits associated with disclosure.  In the next section, we examine 
how the combined behavior of silence and selling links to litigation risk.  
 
6. Selling, silence and litigation risk 
Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) (hereafter “FLS”) address the question of whether earnings 
warnings effectively deter (as opposed to trigger) litigation.  In so doing, they demonstrate an 
important endogeneity at play in this setting: firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to 
issue a warning in the face of earnings disappointment.  Accordingly, using a simultaneous-
equations framework to account for this endogenous relation between disclosure and litigation, 
FLS find no evidence that warnings trigger litigation and, in fact (as discussed earlier), they find 
weak evidence that preemptive disclosure lowers firms’ risk of being sued.  Our earlier analyses, 
however, indicate that the managers who are more likely to warn in the face of impending bad 
news are also more likely to refrain from engaging in opportunistic insider selling.  
Consequently, this raises the question of whether the absence of opportunistic selling, as opposed 
to the presence of a preemptive warning, lowers firms’ litigation risk, as insider trading is not 
considered in FLS. 
Lawsuit and propensity-matched control sample 
To investigate whether trading behavior interacts with disclosure behavior to influence 
firms’ litigation risk, we first replicate the analyses of FLS and then adjust their tests in order to 
consider the interplay between disclosure and trade.  Although we follow the simultaneous-
equations framework of FLS, we make adjustments to their methodology in an effort to take 
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 advantage of recent advances in both approaches to the selection of control samples (i.e., we 
make use of a propensity-matching approach) and the measurement of litigation risk (i.e., we 
employ the litigation risk model of Kim and Skinner (2012)).   
We begin by assembling a sample of firms that faced earnings-related litigation from 
2002 through 2012 using lawsuit data obtained from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu).  Because prior research suggests that firm 
size, industry membership and recent performance play critical roles in the decision to file 
lawsuits (Johnson et al. 2007) and the evidence in FLS suggest that those same factors also 
determine firms’ disclosure decisions, we assemble a propensity-matched sample of control 
firms that faced similar litigation risk during this same time frame following the litigation risk 
model supplied in Equation (3) of Kim and Skinner (2012).  As detailed in Kim and Skinner 
(2012), the litigation risk model takes into account industry membership, firm size, performance 
(both return and sales growth), skewness of returns, volatility, and share turnover, which are also 
variables known to influence firms’ disclosure decisions.20   
Panel A of Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for these 478 lawsuit (SUED = 1) and 
478 control (SUED = 0) firms.  As evidenced by the lack of significant mean or median 
differences, our propensity-matching approach leads us to identify a suitable group of similarly 
situated control firms in terms of industry membership (TECHNOLOGY, RETAIL, REGULATED 
or FPS), firm size (MVE), return skewness (SKEWNESS), and recent growth in sales (SALES 
GROWTH).  Nonetheless, some important differences remain.   While we detect no differences 
in means, we do observe significantly lower median return performance (RETURN) and higher 
median share turnover when we compare the SUED firm to the NON-SUED firm.  In our 
upcoming multivariate tests, we address these lingering disparities with the inclusion of 
additional control variables. 
                                                
20 Please refer to Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. 
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 Shifting attention to our variables of interest, we detect significant mean and median 
differences when comparing both the disclosure and trading behavior of the SUED firms to that 
of the NON-SUED firms.  Consistent with Francis et al. (1994) and Skinner (1997) as well as 
FLS, we find that managers of SUED firms are more likely to warn in the face of earnings 
disappointment.  This reflects the endogeneity between the likelihood of warning and litigation 
risk that FLS highlight.  We, however, also notice that managers of SUED firms tend to have 
sold more shares in the period prior to the market’s receipt of the disappointing earnings news.  
In our upcoming multivariate tests, we will explore the extent to which this potentially 
opportunistic trading behavior undermines or dominates any potential benefits associated with 
preemptive warnings. 
Replication of Field, Lowry and Shu (2005): Does disclosure deter litigation? 
We begin our analyses by replicating the FLS findings in our sample.  To do so, we start 
by confirming a link between litigation risk and earnings warnings using their initial single-stage 
approach.  In particular, we estimate the following logistic regression (firm subscripts omitted): 
WARN = β0 +β1 Log MVE( )+β2 TECHNOLOGY( )+β3 REGULATED( )
    +β4 RETAIL( )+β5 RETURN( )+β6 VOLATILITY( )+β7 TURNOVER( )
    +β8 PRIOR DISCLOSURE( )+β9 SUED( )+ε.
 (2) 
As shown in column [1] of Table 7, we detect a significantly positive coefficient for SUED, 
which aligns with the results presented in FLS (see their Table 3).  After establishing this initial 
link, we move on to test for a link between disclosure and litigation risk again using their initial 
single-stage approach.  In particular, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
SUED = γ0 +γ1 Log MVE( )+γ2 TECHNOLOGY( )+γ3 REGULATED( )
    +γ4 RETAIL( )+γ5 RETURN( )+γ6 VOLATILITY( )+γ7 TURNOVER( )
    +γ8 WARN( )+ε.
 (3) 
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 As shown in column [2] of Table 6, we detect a significantly positive coefficient for WARN, 
which again aligns with results presented in FLS (see their Table 4).  Thus, the evidence 
presented in columns [1] and [2] of Table 7, indicates that the endogeneity between disclosure 
and litigation is present in our sample as well.  In other words, like FLS, we find that the 
likelihood of preemptive warning increases with litigation risk and, absent efforts to address this 
endogeneity, the presence of a warning then appears to increase a firm’s litigation risk.   
Building on these initial findings, we next adjust our regression framework to consider 
the endogenous relation between disclosure and litigation, again following FLS.  In particular, 
we estimate the following system of equations: 
WARN = δ0 +δ1 Log MVE( )+δ2 TECHNOLOGY( )+δ3 REGULATED( )
    +δ4 RETAIL( )+δ5 RETURN( )+δ6 VOLATILITY( )+δ7 TURNOVER( )
    +δ8 PRIOR DISCLOSURE( )+ε.
 (4) 
SUED =θ0 +θ1 Log MVE( )+θ2 TECHNOLOGY( )+θ3 REGULATED( )
    +θ4 RETAIL( )+θ5 RETURN( )+θ6 VOLATILITY( )+θ7 TURNOVER( )
    +θ8 WARN INSTRUMENT( )+ε.
 (5) 
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 7 present results using the full sample of lawsuit and control firms; 
Columns [5] and [6] of Table 7 limit analysis to non-dismissed lawsuits (and the associated 
control firms).  Consistent with the presence of a deterrence effect associated with preemptive 
warning, we detect a significantly negative coefficient for the WARN instrument, as shown in the 
second-stage SUED regression results presented in Specifications [4] and [6] of Table 7.  FLS 
report these same regressions (see their Table 4 for the full sample results; see their Table 5 for 
the results based on the sample that excludes dismissed lawsuits).  In contrast to the somewhat 
weak evidence in FLS, we find strong evidence of a deterrence effect.  That is, using the 
simultaneous-equations framework introduced by FLS, our evidence indicates that preemptive 
warning is associated with reduced litigation risk across all specifications.   
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 Next, we investigate whether managers’ opportunistic selling behavior (which our earlier 
analyses show is associated with the decision to remain silent in the face of earnings 
disappointments) explains the increased rate of litigation associated with the failure to warn. 
Does disclosure deter litigation when managers’ trading behavior is considered? 
 To test whether managers’ trading behavior neutralizes or even reverses the litigation 
benefit associated with preemptive warnings, we introduce measures of insider selling to the 
simultaneous-equation framework of FLS.  Specifically, we estimate the following revised 
system of equations: 
WARN = δ0 +δ1 Log MVE( )+δ2 TECHNOLOGY( )+δ3 REGULATED( )
    +δ4 RETAIL( )+δ5 RETURN( )+δ6 VOLATILITY( )+δ7 TURNOVER( )
    +δ8 PRIOR DISCLOSURE( )+δ9 SALES( )+ε.
 (6) 
SUED =θ0 +θ1 Log MVE( )+θ2 TECHNOLOGY( )+θ3 REGULATED( )
    +θ4 RETAIL( )+θ5 RETURN( )+θ6 VOLATILITY( )+θ7 TURNOVER( )
    +θ8 SILENCE( )+θ9 SALES( )+θ10 SILENCE ∗ SALES( )+ε.
 (7) 
Equation (6) adds trading behavior (SALES) to the first-stage FLS regression.  We measure 
SALES as the total dollar value of insider sales during the class period (scaled by the market 
value of equity).21  To focus attention to the opportunism associated with the combined behavior 
of silence (i.e., the failure to warn) and selling in the face of impending earnings disappointment, 
we reverse the first-stage regression to focus on the prediction of silence (i.e., WARN = 0) in 
order to obtain the predicted value to use in Equation (7).  Using this predicted value of 
SILENCE obtained from the estimation of Equation (6), we test H3 with the inclusion of the 
interaction of SILENCE and SALES in Equation (7). 
                                                
21 Our earlier analyses adjust the measurement of insider sales to take into account that managers likely alter their trading patterns 
in response to firm-level insider trading restrictions.  In these litigation risk analyses, however, we expect that the presence of 
insider selling, regardless of its timing within the quarter, will be used by plaintiffs’ attorneys as evidence of delayed disclosure.  
Consequently, we do not distinguish between RED-, YELLOW-, and GREEN-window trading in these analyses. 
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  We present the results of the second-stage regressions in Table 8.22  Column [1] 
replicates the basic FLS result from columns [3] and [4] of Table 7, but with the prediction of 
SILENCE (as opposed to WARN) in the first-stage.  Columns [2] through [5] introduce various 
measures of insider selling to the analysis.  In particular, columns [2] through [4] measure sales 
using the length of the class period as the trading window, with column [3] focusing on CEO and 
CFO trades only and column [4] classifying trades as routine (“SALES_ROU”) or opportunistic 
(“SALES_OPP”).  Following Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2007), column [5] focuses on 
abnormal trading during the class period, measuring abnormal sales (SALES_AB) as the 
difference in shares traded during the class period and the equivalent length of time immediately 
prior to the beginning of the class period, scaled by shares outstanding.  Finally, column [6] 
includes an indicator variable (GOOD) set equal to one if the firm supplied a good news forecast 
at any point during the class period prior to either the delivery of a bad news warning or the end 
of the class period.    
As shown in Table 8, we find that SILENCE is associated with increased litigation risk 
across all specifications, which suggests that the deterrence effect of warning remains even after 
we introduce SALES to the analysis.  Further, as expected, SALES are also positively related to 
the likelihood of a lawsuit.  Thus, this evidence suggests that disclosure deters and trading 
triggers lawsuit filings.  More important, consistent with H3, we detect a significantly positive 
coefficient for the interaction term (SALES ∗ SILENCE) across all specifications.  Accordingly, 
this evidence indicates that the absence of a warning combined with the presence of selling 
exacerbates the consequences associated with the individual behaviors.  As expected, the 
relations strengthen when we narrow our focus to the trades of CEOs and CFOs (column [3]).   
                                                
22 For brevity, we do not tabulate the first-stage regression, but all results align with expectations.  Further, the introduction of 
trading considerations results in improvements in the fit of the model, as both the Pseudo R2 and ROC area exhibit statistically 
significant improvement (based on log-likelihood tests) in all specifications. 
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 Further, the relations remain when we focus on opportunistic selling (column [4]) or 
abnormal selling (column [5]) behavior in the class period.  In addition to suggesting that there is 
a disclosure benefit associated with bad news warnings, Skinner (1994) indicates that managers 
will be held accountable for their inaccurate good news forecasts.  Consistent with this 
expectation, in column [6] we find that the presence of a good news forecast at any point during 
the class period but prior to the delivery of bad news (i.e., GOOD = 1) is associated with 
increased litigation risk.  Moreover, a good news forecast combined with the absence of a 
warning (i.e., predicted silence) is associated with yet higher rates of litigation.   
Although the results thus far provide strong support for H3, an alternative explanation for 
our findings is that insiders of firms with worse performance prospects are more likely to sell 
their holdings and this poor performance links to increased litigation risk.  That is, poor expected 
future performance drives both insider sales and future litigation risk.  First, given the incentives 
of plaintiffs and their lawyers, we expect that the presence of insider selling makes it easier for 
plaintiffs to assert intentional misconduct by managers.  Consistent with this expectation of a 
main effect of sales, prior literature (e.g., Johnson et al. 2007) documents a link between insider 
selling and litigation risk.  Second, examining the correlations (untabulated) between our insider 
selling variables and future performance (as measured by the 3-day return surrounding the end of 
the class period), we find no evidence that insider sales correlate with future performance.  Yet, 
we do find that returns during the class period are negatively correlated with insider sales, 
suggesting that insiders are less likely to sell when returns are higher.  Following FLS, we 
control for this return but in the analysis in Table 8 we extend the return to include the 3-day 
return surrounding the end of the class period.23  Finally, in untabulated analyses, we also re-
                                                
23 The inclusion of the extended return as well as the introduction of trading considerations results in statistically significant 
increases in the R2 and ROC of the model.  In particular, the R2 climbs from 2.4% (see column [4] of Table 7) to 20.0% (see 
column [1] of Panel A of Table 8), while the ROC increases from 0.591 to 0.790 across the two specifications.  In untabulated 
analyses, we find that the majority of the increase stems from the inclusion of the extended return, although the increase 
attributable to trading considerations is also statistically significant. 
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 estimate our simultaneous-equations framework with an added initial stage that allows trading, 
disclosure and litigation risk to be jointly determined.  In particular, following the model 
supplied in Cheng and Lo (2006), we obtain an estimate of unexpected sales and use this 
abnormal measure of sales in our disclosure (i.e., Equation (6)) and litigation risk (i.e., Equation 
(7)) regressions.  All of our results are robust to this alternative specification. 
Does trading offset the benefit associated with warning? 
Given the evidence presented in Panel A of Table 8, it appears that managers’ trading 
behavior and disclosure behavior combine to play a role in shareholders’ decisions to file a 
lawsuit.  Yet, the question of whether managers’ opportunistic selling completely counteracts the 
benefit associated with preemptive warning remains.  Shifting our attention back to the 
prediction of WARN in the first-stage allows our interaction term (i.e., SALES ∗ WARN) to 
address this question directly.  Accordingly, we present these abbreviated second-stage results in 
Panel B of Table 8.  The coefficient of −2.552 for WARN along with the −57.742 coefficient for 
the interaction of SALES ∗ WARN suggests that the presence of opportunistic trade rarely, if ever, 
completely offsets the benefit associated with disclosure.  Indeed, the magnitudes of these 
coefficients indicate that insiders would need to sell approximately 10% of the firm’s market 
value in the class period in order to completely cancel out the benefit associated with preemptive 
warnings.  Based upon these point estimates, we find that insider selling rarely reaches sufficient 
magnitude to offset the suggested benefit associated with disclosure.  In our litigation sample, the 
extreme values of SALES are sales of 5.2% and 16.5% of MVE for the 95th and 99th percentiles.  
In summary, the combined behavior of silence and selling in the face of impending 
earnings disappointment appears to incrementally raise firms’ litigation risk above and beyond 
the individual effects.  At the same time, the evidence indicates that selling prior to the delivery 
of bad news warning generally offsets some, but not all, of the disclosure benefit of a warning.  
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 Thus, even with the addition of incriminating selling behavior, a preemptive warning provides 
some protection against litigation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Despite potential disclosure benefits, many managers fail to warn prior to an earnings 
disappointment, even when they have guided in the recent past.  In this paper, we provide 
evidence that insider trading helps to explain this silence.  This relation between silence and 
selling in the face of bad news strengthens when we narrow our focus to opportunistic selling 
and when we limit attention to firms with a recent history of supplying guidance.  Thus, the 
evidence indicates that trading incentives help to explain whether managers choose to guide in a 
particular quarter.  These findings also suggest that managers rely on a subtle form of 
opportunism in order to exploit information asymmetries—simply remaining quiet, selling shares 
in this quarter’s open trading window, and then waiting for the earnings disappointment to reveal 
itself next quarter—as opposed to engaging in an overtly opportunistic approach of selling shares 
just prior to supplying a warning about next quarter along with this quarter’s earnings. 
These results raise the question of whether the absence of incriminating trading behavior, 
as opposed to the presence of a cautionary warning, drives the observed reduction in litigation 
risk potentially attributed to disclosure.  Examining a sample of firms that experienced earnings-
related lawsuit filings, we find that silence and selling both independently increase firms’ 
litigation risk.  More important, our evidence indicates that the interaction of silence and selling 
incrementally raises firms’ litigation risk beyond the individual effects.  At the same time, the 
evidence suggests that opportunistic selling prior to the delivery of bad news offsets some, but 
not all, of a warning’s benefit for virtually all of the firms in our litigation sample.  Thus, we 
provide robust evidence that warning reduces litigation risk.  
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  The effectiveness of U.S. securities litigation in punishing opportunistic behavior is hotly 
debated, with some influential legal scholars concluding that the majority of lawsuits reflect 
frivolous actions that unfairly target “deep pocket” defendants and confuse legitimate volatility 
with corporate wrongdoing (Alexander 1991, Grundfest 1994, 1995, Seligman 1994, Helland 
2006, Choi 2007, Johnson et al. 2007, Choi et al. 2009).  Our study informs this ongoing debate.  
In contrast to studies that question whether the merits play any substantial role in triggering 
litigation, our evidence indicates that meritorious factors are important drivers of lawsuit filings.  
Indeed, our findings suggest that “good” disclosers (i.e. voluntary warners) enjoy a reduced risk 
of litigation, while litigation emerges to punish strategic silence, opportunistic selling and the 
incriminating interaction of the two behaviors.  Collectively, our findings underscore the conflict 
between manager-level trading incentives and firm-level disclosure incentives: strategic silence 
interacts with opportunistic selling by managers to increase the litigation consequences borne by 
the firm.  
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 Appendix A n Variable definitions for the firm-quarter trading and disclosure analyses 
For our firm-quarter trading and disclosure analyses, we assemble a sample of 107,307 firm-quarter observations for 
the period of 2001 through 2010 with data available from Compustat (financial statement data), CRSP (price, 
volume and return data), I/B/E/S (analyst forecast data from the unadjusted detail files), First Call (guidance data), 
and Thomson Reuters (insider trading data).  
 
BUNDLE An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm provided an earnings forecast during the 5−day window surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings. 
N_FORECAST An indicator variable set to 1 if BUNDLE=1 and the forecast estimate is less than the pre−forecast prevailing median analyst estimate. 
P_FORECAST An indicator variable set to 1 if BUNDLE=1 and the forecast estimate is greater than the pre−forecast prevailing median analyst estimate. 
C_FORECAST An indicator variable set to 1 if BUNDLE=1 and the forecast estimate is equal to the pre−forecast prevailing median analyst estimate. 
GUIDE_CQTR An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm previously provided earnings guidance for the current quarter’s earnings.  
BUNDLE_PRIOR An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm issued an earnings forecast during the 5−day window surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings last quarter. 
BUNDLE_SQLY 
An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm issued an earnings forecast during the 
5−day window surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings in the same 
quarter of last year. 
RECENT_GUIDER An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm provided earnings guidance in any of the prior 12 quarters. 
COMMITTED_GUIDER An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm has supplied guidance a least 3 times during the past 12 quarters. 
SURPRISE Actual earnings minus the prevailing median analyst estimate, deflated by stock price 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
P_SURPRISE An indicator variable set to 1 if SURPRISE > +0.0001. 
N_SURPRISE An indicator variable set to 1 if SURPRISE < −0.0001. 
LOSS An indicator variable set to 1 if actual earnings is less than 0. 
IMPEND_BAD An indicator set to 1 if the firm reports disappointing earnings news in the next quarter (i.e., if N_SURPRISE=1 or N_FORECAST=1 in quarter t+1). 
DISPERSION The standard deviation of prevailing analyst estimates for the current period’s earnings. 
PRIOR_RET The cumulative stock return over the 90−day period ending 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
MVE The market value of equity (i.e., price multiplied by shares outstanding) measured 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings.   
NUMEST The number of analysts with outstanding estimates 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings.   
PROPMB The proportion of the previous 4 quarters that the firm’s reported earnings met or exceeded analysts’ prevailing median consensus estimates. 
LITIGATION 
RISK 
The ex ante probability estimate of the likelihood that the firm will be the 
subject of 10b-5 litigation in the next quarter, measured as the predicted 
probability derived from a first-stage logit regression in which the dependent 
variable is an indicator set equal to 1 if the firm faces a lawsuit in the quarter 
and the independent variables are firm characteristics (including industry 
membership, firm size, recent performance, share price volatility, return 
skewness and share turnover).  Specifically, we follow the litigation risk 
model supplied in Equation (3) of Kim and Skinner (2012) to develop a 
predicted value of litigation risk as of the prior quarter.   
VOLATILITY The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 90−day period ending 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
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 GREEN_SALES 
The total dollar value of director and officer insider sales (scaled by beginning 
quarter market value) during the trading window starting with the release of 
the current quarter’s earnings and ending 10 trading (14 calendar) days after. 
YELLOW_SALES 
The total dollar value of director and officer insider sales (scaled by beginning 
quarter market value) during the trading window starting 11 trading (15 
calendar) days after the release of the current quarter’s earnings and ending at 
the fiscal quarter end date. 
RED_SALES 
The total dollar value of director and officer insider sales (scaled by beginning 
quarter market value) during the trading window starting with the day after 
the fiscal quarter end date and ending the day before the release of the next 
quarter’s earnings. 
SALES_OPP 
The total dollar value of director and officer insider sales (scaled by beginning 
quarter market value) that are classified as “opportunistic” during the trading 
window starting with the day after the fiscal quarter end date and ending the 
day before the release of the current quarter’s earnings.  We classify trades as 
opportunistic (“OPP”) based on the individual trade-level classification 
scheme described in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). 
SALES_ROU 
The total dollar value of director and officer insider sales (scaled by beginning 
quarter market value) that are classified as “routine” during the trading 
window starting with the day after the fiscal quarter end date and ending the 
day before the release of the current quarter’s earnings.  We classify trades as 
routine (“ROU”) based on the individual trade-level classification scheme 
described in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). 
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 Appendix B n Variable definitions for the litigation risk analyses 
For our litigation risk analyses, we assemble a sample of 478 firms facing earnings-related litigation from 2002 
through 2012 using lawsuit data obtained from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(http://securities.stanford.edu) (SUED firms) and a sample of propensity-matched, control firms (NON-SUED firms).  
 
SUED An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm faced earnings-related litigation.  
MVE The market value of equity (i.e., price multiplied by shares outstanding) at the beginning of the year prior to the lawsuit filing. 
RETURN The cumulative stock return in the year leading up to the lawsuit filing. 
VOLATILITY The standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year leading up to the lawsuit. 
SKEWNESS The skewness of the daily stock returns in the year prior to the lawsuit. 
TURNOVER 
The total turnover of the firm’s shares in the prior year, computed as the sum of 
the percentage turnover for each trading day in the year leading up to the lawsuit 
filing.  
SALES_GROWTH The firm’s change in sales (Compustat item SALE) scaled by beginning assets in the year prior to the lawsuit filing. 
TECHNOLOGY An indicator set to 1 if the firm operates in the technology industry, as defined in Field, Lowry and Shu (2005). 
RETAIL An indicator set to 1 if the firm operates in the retail industry, as defined in Field, Lowry and Shu (2005). 
REGULATED An indicator set to 1 if the firm operates in a regulated industry, as defined in Field, Lowry and Shu (2005). 
FPS 
An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm operates in a “high-litigation” industry, 
as defined by Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) and as employed by Kim 
and Skinner (2012).  Specifically, “high-litigation” industries include: 
biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), 
electronics (3600-3674), and retailing (5200-5961). 
WARN 
An indicator set to 1 if the firm issues a management forecast of negative news 
(obtained from First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines files augmented by 
IBES guidance datafeed beginning in September of 2010) in the 90 days prior to 
the end of the class period (the fiscal year) for sued (non-sued) firms or issues a 
downward revision in guidance (item 26 in the Capital IQ Key Developments 
database) during the class period (the fiscal year) for sued (non-sued) firms. 
GOOD 
An indicator set to 1 if the firm issues a management forecast of positive news 
(obtained from First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines files augmented by 
I/B/E/S guidance datafeed beginning in September of 2010) in the year prior to 
the end of the class period (the fiscal year) for sued (non-sued) firms or issues a 
upward revision in guidance (item 27 in the Capital IQ Key Developments 
database) during the class period (the fiscal year) for sued (non-sued) firms. 
PRIOR_ 
DISCLOSURE 
An indicator set to 1 if the firm issues guidance in the year prior to the start of 
the class period (for sued firms) or the year prior to the start of the previous 
fiscal year (for non-sued firms). 
SALES The total dollar value of insider sales during the class period scaled by MVE. 
SALES_OPP 
The total dollar value of insider sales classified as “opportunistic” during the 
class period scaled by MVE.  We classify trades as opportunistic (“OPP”) based 
on the individual trade-level classification scheme described in Cohen et al. 
(2012). 
SALES_ROU 
The total dollar value of insider sales classified as “routine” during the class 
period scaled by MVE.  We classify trades as opportunistic (“ROU”) based on 
the individual trade-level classification scheme described in Cohen et al. (2012). 
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 CLASS_END_RET 
For sued firms, the cumulative three-day stock return centered on the class 
period end date.  For non-sued firms, the cumulative three-day stock return 
surrounding the firm’s last earnings announcement prior to the end of the 
“pseudo” class period. 
CLASS_PERIOD_RET 
For sued firms, the cumulative stock return over the class period.  For non-sued 
firms, the cumulative stock return for the length of time equal to the match firms' 
class period, ending on the non-sued firm's fiscal year end date. 
SALES_AB 
Abnormal insider sales, defined as the difference in shares traded over the 
trading window (using the same trading window as in SALES) and the same 
period of time immediately prior to the beginning of the trading window, scaled 
by beginning shares outstanding consistent with Johnson et al. (2007). 
43
 Figure 1 n Insider selling and the decision to warn or to remain silent in the face of 
impending earnings disappointment 
 
 
 
Trading Windows for SALES
GREEN G RDQ → RDQ+14
YELLOW Y RDQ+15 →FQE
RED R FQE+1 → RDQ−1
RDQ = Report Date of Quarterly Earnings; 
FQE = Fiscal Quarter End Date.
✸
WARNING
versus
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FQE
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FQE
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FQE
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Table 1 n Descriptive statistics 
Panel A examines the full sample of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010; Panel B examines 
the subset of 43,664 firm-quarter observations where managers face impending negative news, as measured by the 
presence of disappointing/negative earnings news or forecast news next quarter (IMPEND_BAD=1).  Refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions and sources. 
 
Panel A: Full sample (n=107,307) 
 
  Mean Median Q1 Q3 
      
BUNDLE  0.307 0 0 1 
GUIDE_CQTR  0.269 0 0 1 
BUNDLE_PRIOR  0.310 0 0 1 
SURPRISE  −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.002 
P_SURPRISE  0.581 0 1 1 
N_SURPRISE  0.305 0 0 1 
LOSS  0.201 0 0 0 
DISPERSION  0.032 0.003 0.014 0.034 
PRIOR_RET  0.033 −0.079 0.040 0.152 
MVE ($ millions)  3,963 262 778 2,614 
NUMEST  5.443 2 4 7 
PROPMB  0.702 0.500 0.750 1.000 
P_FORECAST  0.030 0.017 0.025 0.036 
C_FORECAST  0.077 0 0 0 
N_FORECAST  0.069 0 0 0 
 
Panel B: Impending negative news subsample, partitioned by forecast news (n=43,664) 
 
 Positive 
forecast 
(n=3,029) 
Confirming 
forecast 
(n=3,202) 
Negative 
forecast 
(n=11,238) 
No  
forecast 
(n=26,195) 
 Mean  Med. Mean  Med. Mean  Med. Mean  Med. 
             
GUIDE_CQTR 0.570  1 0.707  1 0.617  1 0.111  0 
BUNDLE_PRIOR 0.848  1 0.812  1 0.851  1 0.090  0 
SURPRISE 0.002  0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 −0.004  0.000 
P_SURPRISE 0.726  1 0.622  1 0.610  1 0.453  0 
N_SURPRISE 0.166  0 0.218  0 0.249  0 0.449  0 
LOSS 0.058  0 0.097  0 0.089  0 0.300  0 
DISPERSION 0.025  0.014 0.016  0.009 0.025  0.014 0.040  0.015 
PRIOR_RET 0.038  0.048 0.030  0.039 0.001  0.020 0.013  0.023 
MVE 6,331  1,708 4,391  967 5,760  1,435 2,585  503 
NUMEST 6.6  5 5.3  4 6.9  6 4.6  3 
PROPMB 0.820  1 0.802  0.75 0.779  0.75 0.600  0.5 
VOLATILITY 0.024  0.021 0.026  0.022 0.026  0.022 0.033  0.027 
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Table 2 n Recent and committed guiders 
Panel A examines the subset of 22,566 firm-quarters where managers face impending negative news 
(IMPEND_BAD=1) and have a recent guiding history (RECENT_GUIDER=1).  Panel A tabulates this subsample 
by the number of times the firm has bundled guidance in the past 12 quarters.  Panel B displays descriptive statistics 
for the subset of 19,166 firm-quarter observations where managers with committed guiding histories face impending 
negative news (IMPEND_BAD=1 and COMMITTED_GUIDER=1).  Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions 
and sources. 
 
Panel A: Bundled guidance frequency for firm-quarters of recent guiders facing impending 
negative news (n = 22,566) 
 
Recent 
guider? ® 
Committed 
guider? ® 
# of bundled 
forecasts in prior 
12 quarters 
Did the firm bundle in 
the current quarter? Total 
% bundled in 
the current 
quarter No Yes 
● ○ 0 – 2 2,112 1,794 3,906 45.9% 
● ● 3 – 6 1,959 3,501 5,460 64.1% 
● ● 7 – 9 1,120 3,494 4,614 75.7% 
● ● 10 – 12 681 7,905 8,586 92.0% 
 
®  Because we define firms to have a recent guiding history if they have supplied any type of guidance (bundled or 
non-bundled) in the last 12 quarters, it is possible for a firm to be classified as a recent guider but not have any 
bundled guidance in the most recent 12 quarters (this occurs for 290 firm-quarter observations) and it is possible for 
a firm to be classified as a committed guider with less than 3 pieces of bundled guidance in the most recent 12 
quarters (this occurs for 506 firm-quarter observations).   
 
Panel B: Impending negative news and committed guider subsample, partitioned by 
forecast news (n=19,166) 
 
 Positive 
forecast 
(n=2,599) 
Confirming 
forecast 
(n=2,643) 
Negative 
forecast 
(n=9,717) 
No  
forecast 
(n=4,207) 
 Mean  Med. Mean  Med. Mean  Med. Mean  Med. 
             
GUIDE_CQTR 0.588  1 0.748  1 0.634  1 0.359  0 
BUNDLE_PRIOR 0.905  1 0.886  1 0.901  1 0.418  0 
SURPRISE 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.005  0.000 
P_SURPRISE 0.731  1 0.633  1 0.622  1 0.481  0 
N_SURPRISE 0.164  0 0.207  0 0.241  0 0.394  0 
LOSS 0.052  0 0.079  0 0.081  0 0.252  0 
DISPERSION 0.025  0.015 0.016  0.009 0.026  0.014 0.040  0.017 
PRIOR_RET 0.037  0.048 0.030  0.041 0.002  0.020 0.006  0.019 
MVE 6,822  1,947 4,819  1,063 6,076  1,507 3,472  727 
NUMEST 6.8  5 5.5  4 6.9  6 5.9  4 
PROPMB 0.827  1 0.811  1 0.783  0.75 0.676  0.75 
VOLATILITY 0.023  0.020 0.024  0.021 0.025  0.022 0.032  0.026 
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Table 3 n Intra-quarter insider selling 
This table documents that insiders disproportionately concentrate their trade in the days immediately following 
quarterly earnings releases.  The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  
Panel A provides statistics for the full sample, while Panel B provides statistics for the subset of firm-quarter 
observations where managers face impending negative news (IMPEND_BAD=1).  We classify sales as routine 
(“SALES_ROU”) or opportunistic (“SALES_OPP”) based on the individual trade-level classification scheme 
described in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012).  We measure insider sales over three distinct trading windows 
during each quarter.  As shown in Figure 1, we measure GREEN_SALES as the sales most likely to be allowed 
under the company’s insider trading policy (i.e., the sales fall in the two-week (10-day trading) period starting after 
the release of last quarter’s earnings).  We measure RED_SALES as the sales least likely to be allowed under the 
company’s insider trading policy (i.e., the sales that take place between current fiscal quarter end (FQE) and the 
current quarter’s RDQ).  YELLOW_SALES capture the sales that take place between the green and the red trading 
windows.  (Results are robust to increasing the GREEN_SALES trading window from 10 to 15 trading days.)  Refer 
to Appendix A for variable definitions and sources. 
 
Panel A: Full sample (n=107,307) 
 
Window classification and 
definition 
Median 
window 
length 
[calendar days] 
Mean insider 
sales  
[$ millions] 
% 
Sales  
ROU 
% 
Sales  
OPP 
%  
Not 
Class. 
       
Green RDQ → RDQ+14 14 (16%) 0.922 (36%) 13% 49% 38% 
Yellow RDQ+15 → FQE 49 (54%) 1.424 (55%) 10% 52% 38% 
Red  FQE+1 → RDQ−1 27 (30%) 0.227 (9%) 7% 54% 39% 
Quarterly total 90 (100%) 2.573 (100%)    
 
Panel B: Impending negative news subsample (n=43,664) 
 
Window classification and 
definition 
Median 
window 
length 
[calendar days] 
Mean insider 
sales  
[$ millions] 
% 
Sales  
ROU 
% 
Sales  
OPP 
%  
Not 
Class. 
       
Green RDQ → RDQ+14 14 (16%) 0.886 (36%) 14% 51% 35% 
Yellow RDQ+15 → FQE 49 (54%) 1.342 (55%) 11% 53% 36% 
Red  FQE+1 → RDQ−1 27 (30%) 0.221 (9%) 7% 55% 38% 
Quarterly total 90 (100%) 2.449 (100%)    
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Table 4 n Does insider selling affect the likelihood of issuing guidance this quarter? 
The full sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  All regression 
specifications include an intercept and controls for industry and time effects.  •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions and sources.   
 
Panel A:  Likelihood of bundling negative forecast (i.e., warning) 
Panel A tests the likelihood that an earnings announcement is bundled with a negative news forecast.  We expect 
that the likelihood of warning increases with litigation risk and decreases with the presence of insider selling, 
particularly in the windows of trade (i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk of penalties. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = N_FORECAST. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Limit sample to:             
Impending bad news  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Recent guiders  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Committed guiders  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ● 
Current pos. surprise  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ● 
CEO/CFO trades only  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ● 
             
litigation risk (+)  0.123 •••  0.115 •••  0.476 •••  1.613 •••  1.297 •••  1.307 ••• 
  3.92   3.61   2.92   5.07   5.03   5.21  
lag_green_sales (−)  −0.191 •••  −0.314 •  −0.878 ••  −0.886 •  −1.339 •••  −2.758 ••• 
  −2.61   −1.94   −2.46   −1.79   −2.71   −2.98  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  −0.086  −0.061  −0.353  −0.858 •  −0.569  −0.350 
  −1.49   −1.14   −1.27   −1.69   −1.52   −0.80  
lag_red_sales (?)  0.019  0.001  0.426  0.711  0.470  0.288 
  0.87   0.10   0.87   1.18   0.64   0.16  
green_sales (−)  −0.367 •••  −0.524 •••  −1.457 •••  −1.949 •••  −2.039 •••  −3.369 ••• 
  −5.80   −3.95   −4.05   −4.09   −3.77   −3.19  
             
guide_cqtr  0.040 •••  0.038 •••  0.023 •••  0.018 •••  0.014 ••  0.014 •• 
  17.12   10.13   5.14   3.89   2.44   2.44  
bundle_prior  0.249 •••  0.304 •••  0.285 •••  0.292 •••  0.284 •••  0.280 ••• 
  87.32   63.62   30.06   27.97   19.51   19.50  
p_surprise  −0.018 •••  0.000  −0.004  −0.009       
  −6.37   0.23   −0.51   −0.12        
n_surprise  0.005  0.007  0.021  0.023       
  0.60   0.91   1.19   1.07        
|surprise|  −0.268 •••  −0.151 •••  −0.806 •••  −2.105 •••  −0.712 •••  −0.698 ••• 
  −6.43   −4.97   −5.45   −5.70   −3.73   −3.71  
loss  −0.034 •••  −0.053 •••  −0.074 •••  −0.059 •••  −0.052 ••  −0.053 •• 
  −7.85   −7.50   −5.62   −4.62   −2.43   −2.29  
dispersion  −0.186 •••  −0.171 •••  −0.075  −0.073  −0.071  −0.062 
  −4.91   −3.62   −1.05   −1.56   −0.40   −0.40  
prior_ret  −0.061 •••  −0.049 •••  −0.085 •••  −0.106 •••  −0.124 •••  −0.126 ••• 
  −12.12   −5.72   −5.63   −6.13   −5.33   −5.70  
log(mve)  0.004 •••  0.010 •••  0.013 •••  0.009 •••  0.010 ••  0.010 •• 
  3.57   5.97   4.85   3.23   2.18   2.40  
log(numest)  0.024 •••  0.033 •••  0.046 •••  0.042 •••  0.033 •••  0.033 ••• 
  14.72   11.87   8.08   7.08   3.76   3.79  
probmb  −0.018 ••  0.006  −0.044 ••  −0.047 ••  −0.067 •••  −0.064 ••• 
  −2.19   1.40   −2.01   −2.40   −2.57   −2.67  
volatility  −0.168 ••  −0.081  −0.202  −0.122  0.328  0.317 
  −2.40   −1.41   −1.13   −1.18   0.35   0.40  
             
             
n  107,307  43,664  22,566  19,166  11,639  11,639 
Pseudo R2  23.2%  29.9%  12.0%  10.5%  8.6%  8.5% 
ROC area  0.854  0.854  0.694  0.679  0.665  0.664 
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Table 4 n Does insider selling affect the likelihood of issuing guidance this quarter?  
(continued) 
 
Panel B:  Likelihood of bundling positive forecast 
Panel B tests the likelihood that an earnings announcement is bundled with a positive news forecast.  We expect that 
the likelihood of a positive news disclosure decreases with litigation risk and increases with the presence of insider 
selling, particularly in the windows of trade (i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk of penalties. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = P_FORECAST. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Limit sample to:             
Impending bad news  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Recent guiders  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Committed guiders  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ● 
Current pos. surprise  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ● 
CEO/CFO trades only  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ● 
             
litigation risk (−)  −0.271 •••  −0.363 •••  −0.612 •••  −0.829 •••  −0.961 •••  −1.149 ••• 
  −7.81   −6.12   −6.46   −6.50   −5.72   −5.93  
lag_green_sales (+)  0.192 •••  0.325 •••  0.721 •••  0.827 •••  1.185 •••  1.454 ••• 
  5.45   5.20   5.10   4.93   4.91   3.53  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  0.045  −0.067  −0.094  0.159  0.203  −0.222 
  0.05   −0.22   −0.12   0.19   0.22   −0.95  
lag_red_sales (?)  0.027  −0.009  −0.079  −0.214  −0.247  −0.406 
  0.39   −0.60   −0.44   −0.94   −0.76   −0.64  
green_sales (+)  0.260 •••  0.248 •••  0.538 •••  0.731 •••  0.972 •••  1.651 ••• 
  6.78   3.73   3.28   3.73   3.34   3.38  
             
Other controls included:  Industry effects, time effects, guide_cqtr, bundle_prior, p_surprise, n_surprise, 
|surprise|, loss, dispersion, prior_ret, log(mve), log(numest), probmb, and volatility. 
 
             
             
n  107,307  43,664  22,566  19,166  11,639  11,639 
Pseudo R2  11.6%  8.1%  4.5%  4.4%  4.1%  3.9% 
ROC area  0.836  0.805  0.679  0.675  0.656  0.653 
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Table 4 n Does insider selling affect the likelihood of issuing guidance this quarter?  
(continued) 
 
Panel C:  Likelihood of bundling when there is increased expectation of warning 
Panel C tests the likelihood that an earnings announcement is bundled with a news forecast for the subset of 11,716 
firm-quarter observations where managers with committed guiding histories face impending negative news and 
increased expectation of warning (i.e., COMMITTED_GUIDER=1, IMPEND_BAD=1, BUNDLE_PRIOR=1, and 
BUNDLE_SQLY=1).  Specifications [1] and [2] predict the issuance of a negative forecast; Specifications [3] and 
[4] predict the issuance of a positive forecast.  In specfications [1] and [2], we expect that the likelihood of warning 
increases with litigation risk and decreases with the presence of insider selling, particularly in the windows of trade 
(i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk of penalties.  In specifications [3] and [4], we expect that the 
likelihood of a positive news disclosure decreases with litigation risk and increases with the presence of insider 
selling, particularly in the windows of trade (i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk of penalties. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = FORECAST. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]   
          
    N_FORECAST P_FORECAST  
              
Limit sample to:             
Impending bad news   ●  ●  ●  ●   
Recent guiders   ●  ●  ●  ●   
Committed guiders    ●  ●  ●  ●   
Bundled in same quarter last year   ●  ●  ●  ●   
Bundled in prior quarter    ●  ●  ●  ●   
CEO/CFO trades only    ○  ●  ○  ●   
             
litigation risk (+/+/−/−)    1.383 •••  1.357 •••  −0.848 •••  −0.679 •••   
     5.04   5.20   −5.33   −5.52     
lag_green_sales (−/−/+/+)   −1.407 •••  −2.133 •••  1.119 •••  0.857 ••   
     −2.42   −2.09   4.02   2.01     
lag_yellow_sales (?)    −0.397  −0.319  0.088  −0.154   
     −0.78   −0.43   0.12   −0.62     
lag_red_sales (?)    0.717  1.819  0.074  0.469   
     0.73   0.83   0.22   0.57     
green_sales (−/−/+/+)   −2.269 •••  −3.432 •••  1.079 •••  1.731 •••   
     −3.62   −2.95   3.56   3.58     
             
 
Other controls included:  Industry effects, time effects, guide_cqtr, bundle_prior, p_surprise, n_surprise, 
|surprise|, loss, dispersion, prior_ret, log(mve), log(numest), probmb, and volatility. 
  
             
             
n    11,716  11,716  11,716  11,716   
Pseudo R2    3.9%  3.8%  3.9%  3.7%   
ROC area    0.614  0.613  0.652  0.649   
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Table 5 n Does opportunistic selling affect the likelihood of issuing guidance this quarter? 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  We classify trades as routine 
(“SALES_ROU”) or opportunistic (“SALES_OPP”) based on the individual trade-level classification scheme 
described in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012).  All regression specifications include an intercept, controls for 
industry and time effects, and include the control variables shown in Table 3.  •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions and sources. 
 
Panel A:  Likelihood of bundling negative forecast (i.e., warning) 
Panel A tests the likelihood that an earnings announcement is bundled with a negative news forecast.  We expect 
that the likelihood of warning increases with litigation risk and decreases with the presence of opportunistic insider 
selling, particularly in the windows of trade (i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk of penalties. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = N_FORECAST. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Limit sample to:             
Impending bad news  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Recent guiders  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Committed guiders  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ● 
Current pos. surprise  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ● 
CEO/CFO trades only  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ● 
             
litigation risk (+)  0.100 •••  0.108 •••  0.385 •••  1.416 •••  1.292 •••  1.193 ••• 
  4.01   3.69   3.00   5.17   5.16   5.28  
             
Opportunistic sales:             
lag_green_sales (−)  −0.120  −0.185  −0.664  −0.605  −1.909 ••  −3.305 •• 
  −1.07   −0.76   −1.23   −0.95   −2.33   −2.36  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  −0.047  −0.042  −0.163  −0.385  −0.576  −0.440 
  −1.04   −0.26   −0.34   −0.60   −1.17   −0.66  
lag_red_sales (?)  0.121  0.153  0.873  1.201  0.608  −1.528 
  1.50   0.78   1.19   1.36   0.58   −0.61  
green_sales (−)  −0.396 •••  −0.685 •••  −1.922 •••  −2.092 •••  −3.107 •••  −3.020 •• 
  −4.64   −3.52   −3.81   −3.64   −3.34   −2.06  
             
Routine sales:             
lag_green_sales (?)  −0.192  −0.961 •  −1.921  −2.349  −1.561  −0.452 
  −0.62   −1.76   −1.37   −1.08   −0.64   −0.06  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  0.017  −0.134  −0.379  −1.033  1.050  −4.986 
  0.42   −0.56   −0.54   −1.09   0.79   −1.05  
lag_red_sales (?)  0.034  0.672  2.200  2.657  1.716  −1.238 
  0.19   0.64   0.77   0.85   0.56   −0.10  
green_sales (?)  −0.480  0.032  −0.257  0.361  −2.162  −5.450 
  −1.37   0.03   −0.13   0.20   −0.98   −1.01  
             
Other controls included:  Industry effects, time effects, guide_cqtr, bundle_prior, p_surprise, n_surprise, 
|surprise|, loss, dispersion, prior_ret, log(mve), log(numest), probmb, and volatility. 
 
             
             
n  107,307  43,664  22,566  19,166  11,639  11,639 
Pseudo R2  23.1%  29.9%  12.0%  10.4%  8.5%  8.5% 
ROC area  0.854  0.854  0.694  0.679  0.664  0.663 
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Table 5 n Does opportunistic selling affect the likelihood of issuing guidance this quarter? 
(continued) 
 
Panel B:  Likelihood of bundling positive forecast 
Panel B tests the likelihood that an earnings announcement is bundled with a positive news forecast.  We expect that 
the likelihood of a positive news disclosure decreases with litigation risk and increases with the presence of 
opportunistic insider selling, particularly in the windows of trade (i.e., GREEN) where managers face reduced risk 
of penalties. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = P_FORECAST. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Limit sample to:             
Impending bad news  ○  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Recent guiders  ○  ○  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Committed guiders  ○  ○  ○  ●  ●  ● 
Current pos. surprise  ○  ○  ○  ○  ●  ● 
CEO/CFO trades only  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  ● 
             
litigation risk (−)  −0.307 •••  −0.353 •••  −0.493 •••  −0.807 •••  −1.109 •••  −1.145 ••• 
  −7.98   −6.21   −6.56   −6.60   −5.81   −6.00  
             
Opportunistic sales:             
lag_green_sales (+)  0.188 •••  0.272 •••  0.645 •••  0.673 •••  1.225 •••  1.404 •• 
  4.20   3.66   3.20   2.91   3.09   2.19  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  0.023  0.052  0.119  0.220  0.311  −0.399 
  0.34   0.82   0.81   1.17   1.07   −1.17  
lag_red_sales (?)  −0.033  −0.061  −0.293  −0.414  −0.532  −1.100 
  −0.73   −1.11   −1.14   −1.20   −1.04   −1.00  
green_sales (+)  0.258 •••  0.260 •••  0.616 •••  0.764 •••  1.302 •••  1.572 •• 
  5.29   3.58   3.13   3.10   2.97   2.36  
             
Routine sales:             
lag_green_sales (?)  0.141  −0.019  −0.060  −0.055  −0.238  −2.190 
  0.60   −0.41   −0.26   −0.13   −0.20   −0.89  
lag_yellow_sales (?)  −0.016 •  −0.052  −0.084  −0.223  −0.306  2.499 
  −1.77   −0.46   −0.34   −0.52   −0.48   1.15  
lag_red_sales (?)  0.485 •  0.037  0.193  0.283  0.640  9.530 
  1.74   0.22   0.31   0.41   0.67   1.35  
green_sales (?)  0.175  0.054  0.063  0.147  0.627  2.170 
  0.53   0.15   0.15   0.29   0.73   1.07  
             
Other controls included:  Industry effects, time effects, guide_cqtr, bundle_prior, p_surprise, n_surprise, 
|surprise|, loss, dispersion, prior_ret, log(mve), log(numest), probmb, and volatility. 
 
             
             
n  107,307  43,664  22,566  19,166  11,639  11,639 
Pseudo R2  11.6%  8.1%  4.4%  4.3%  3.9%  3.9% 
ROC area  0.836  0.804  0.678  0.673  0.653  0.652 
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Table 6 n Descriptive statistics for lawsuit and propensity-matched control sample 
This table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of 478 firms facing earnings-related litigation from 2002 through 2012 using lawsuit data obtained from 
Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu) (SUED firms) and a sample of propensity-matched, control firms 
(NON-SUED firms).  Specifically, using the litigation risk model supplied in Equation (3) of Kim and Skinner (2012), we assemble a propensity-matched control 
sample of firms facing similar litigation risk.  As detailed in Kim and Skinner (2012), the litigation risk model includes the following variables:  FPS, Log Assets, 
Sales Growth, Return, Skewness, Volatility, and Turnover.  We supply statistics for the SUED and NON-SUED firms.  •••,••,• denote instances where the two 
samples differ significantly at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two−tailed tests.  Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions and sources. 
 
 SUED = 0 
(n = 478) 
SUED = 1 
(n = 478) 
Tests of 
differences 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median 
         
Control variables:         
MVE (millions) 9,010 1,278 26,871 9,418 1,275 27,760   
return 0.179 0.054 0.718 0.132 −0.033 0.784  •• 
volatility 0.034 0.029 0.019 0.035 0.032 0.016  • 
skewness 0.025 0.138 0.946 −0.003 0.069 1.290   
turnover 3.429 2.171 3.633 3.779 2.916 3.378  ••• 
sales growth 0.065 0.034 0.251 0.059 0.022 0.275   
technology  0.268 0 0.443 0.285 0 0.452   
retail  0.082 0 0.274 0.092 0 0.289   
regulated  0.107 0 0.309 0.084 0 0.277   
FPS 0.368 0 0.483 0.368 0 0.483   
         
Disclosure & trading 
variables:         
warn 0.151 0 0.358 0.395 0 0.489 ••• ••• 
good 0.221 0 0.416 0.184 0 0.387   
sales 0.477% 0.005% 1.533% 2.559% 0.227% 20.109% •• ••• 
sales_OPP 0.456% 0.004% 1.493% 2.519% 0.199% 20.108% •• ••• 
sales_ROU 0.021% 0% 0.166% 0.040% 0% 0.240%  •• 
 
53
  
Table 7 n Does disclosure deter litigation? (Replication of Field, Lowry and Shu 2005) 
This table replicates the main results of Field, Lowry and Shu (2005).  Specification [1] confirms the presence of a 
preemption effect in our sample: firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to warn of bad news early.  
Specification [2] confirms that, absent efforts to address the endogeneity between warning and litigation risk, 
warning appears to increase firms’ litigation risk.  Specifications [3], [4], [5], and [6] use a simultaneous-equations 
framework to develop a predicted value of WARN in order to confirm the presence of a deterrence effect in our 
sample: the WARN instrument is associated with reduced likelihood of litigation after controlling for the positive 
relation between litigation risk and the likelihood of early warning.  Specifications [5] and [6] limit analysis to non-
dismissed lawsuits (and their associated control firms).  Results are robust to the inclusion of FPS (an indicator 
variable coded based on the high-litigation industries identified by Francis et al. (1994) and used by Kim and 
Skinner (2012)) instead of technology, regulated and retail, as well as the inclusion of an indicator for the fourth 
quarter and sales growth.  •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed 
tests.  Intercept included but not reported.  Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions and sources. 
  
  Dependent variable = WARN or SUED. Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
              
  Single-stage approach Two-stage approach Two-stage approach 
  WARN SUED WARN SUED WARN SUED 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
              
log mve  0.010 0.010 0.014 0.034 ••• 0.012 0.037 ••• 
  1.16  1.06  1.61  3.15  1.13  2.74  
technology  0.118 ••• −0.026 0.117 ••• 0.128 ••• 0.109 ••• 0.117 •• 
  3.90  −0.70  3.69  2.66  2.72  1.99  
regulated  −0.156 ••• −0.015 −0.182 ••• −0.194 ••• −0.197 •• −0.183 •• 
  −2.54  −0.28  −2.76  −2.90  −2.41  −2.18  
retail  0.076 • −0.008 0.089 • 0.138 •• 0.086 0.053 
  1.68  −0.13  1.90  2.12  1.40  0.61  
return  −0.022 −0.015 −0.025 −0.048 •• 0.001 −0.031 
  −1.16  −0.72  −1.24  −2.15  0.04  −1.14  
volatility  −2.513 •• 1.400 −2.095 • −1.087 −2.728 •• −3.210 •• 
  −2.35  1.27  −1.94  −0.87  −2.00  −1.99  
turnover  0.004 0.003 0.004 0.009 • 0.002 0.013 •• 
  0.84  0.61  0.92  1.71  0.29  1.97  
prior DISC + 0.161 •••   0.133 •••   0.147 •••   
  5.83    4.67    4.03    
SUED + 0.249 •••           
  8.75            
WARN +   0.301 •••         
    8.05          
WARN instr. −       −0.883 •••   −1.016 ••• 
        −3.87    −3.83  
              
              
n  956 956 956 956 574 574 
Pseudo R2  15.5% 7.9% 7.6% 2.4% 8.8% 3.9% 
ROC area  0.755 0.650 0.680 0.591 0.697 0.621 
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Table 8 n Does disclosure deter litigation when managers’ trading behavior is considered? 
 
Panel A:  Silence combined with trading and litigation risk 
In Panel A, we present the results of the second-stage litigation risk regression (dependent variable: SUED = 1), 
following Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) (as shown in specifications [4] and [6] of Table 7).  We obtain a predicted 
value for silence (i.e., WARN = 0) by reversing the predicted value of WARN in the regressions.  The inclusion of 
silence tests for evidence of a deterrence effect (i.e., failure to warn associated with increased litigation risk).  The 
interaction of sales with silence tests for evidence that the combined behavior of selling and silence is associated 
with increased litigation risk.  Specification [1] presents the results without trading variables.  Specification [2] 
measures sales using the length of the class period as the trading window.  Specification [3] uses CEO and CFO 
trades only.  Specification [4] classifies trades as routine (“SALES_ROU”) or opportunistic (“SALES_OPP”) based 
on the trade-level classification scheme in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012).  Specification [5] measures trading 
as the difference in shares traded during the class period and the equivalent length of time immediately prior to the 
beginning of the class period, scaled by shares outstanding, consistent with Johnson et al. (2007).  The inclusion of 
good in Specification [6] tests for increased litigation risk associated with supplying a good news forecast at any 
point during the class period prior to either the delivery of a bad news warning or the end of the class period; the 
interaction of good with silence tests for increased litigation risk associated with the delivery of a good news 
forecast in combination with the failure to warn during the class period.  The additional control variables from Table 
7 are included but not tabulated.  •••, ••, • denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-
tailed tests.  Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions and sources. 
 
  Dependent variable = SUED. 
Mean marginal effect (coefficient t-stat below) 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
                   
silence (+)  0.883 •••  0.479 •••  0.487 •••  0.500 •••  0.475 ••  0.326 
  3.87  2.61  2.60  2.74  2.49  1.60 
sales (+)     11.010 •••  21.800 •••        10.926 ••• 
     6.26  5.29        6.28 
sales × silence (+)     10.829 •••  21.392 •••        10.688 ••• 
     5.89  5.07        5.89 
sales_opp (+)           11.481 •••       
           6.27       
sales_opp × silence (+)           11.259 •••       
           5.91       
sales_rou (+)           −12.93       
           −1.55       
sales_rou × silence (+)           −65.17       
           −1.07       
sales_ab (+)              4.205 •••    
              2.83    
sales_ab × silence (+)              8.407 •••    
              2.93    
good (+)                 0.155 
                 1.52 
good × silence (+)                 0.545 •• 
                 1.98 
             
             
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Table 7 controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2  20.0%  25.0%  23.7%  25.2%  21.3%  25.4%  
ROC area  0.790  0.821  0.812  0.822  0.798  0.824  
n  956  956  956  956  956  956 
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Table 8 n Does disclosure deter litigation when managers’ trading behavior is considered?  
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Warning combined with trading and litigation risk 
In Panel B we present the second-stage results after reversing the first-stage prediction (i.e., predicting WARN=1).  
The interaction of sales with warn tests whether insider selling moderates the deterrence effect of disclosure.  •••,••,• 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  Refer to Appendix B for 
variable definitions and sources. 
 
  Dependent variable = SUED 
 
 Coefficient 
Mean 
marginal 
effect 
t-stat  
warn − −2.552 −0.479 −2.61 ••• 
sales + 58.705 11.010 6.26 ••• 
sales × warn − −57.742 −10.829 −5.89 ••• 
n  956 
Intercept / Other Controls  Yes / Yes 
Pseudo R2 / ROC Area  25.0% / 0.821 
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